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Summary findings
Political  outcomes  - such  as agricultural  taxation,  defined  property  rights  - and the presence  of
subsidization,  and  the provision  of public  goods  - result  organizational  residues  - not  only  reduce  peasants'
from  political  bargaining  among  interest  groups.  Such  bargaining  power  but  may also  make  it more  profitable
bargaining  is likely  to be efficiency-enhancing  and  for  powerful  groups  to prefer  rent  seeking  to productive
growth-enhancing  when  equally  powerful  interest  groups  activities.
- aware  of the  economywide  budget  constraint  and  How  can  these  undesirable  outcomes  be avoided,  and
know  the economic  implications  of different  policy  how  can sustainable  policy  changes  be initiated?
options  - participate,  and  when  impartial  institutions  Experience  indicates  that  fiscal crises  of the state,  often
are available  to enforce  decisions.  The  greater  the  triggered  or  aggravated  by an external  shock,  can cause
deviation  from  these  conditions,  the greater  the  potential  lasting  changes  of policies  and  institutions.  By forcing  the
for  efficiency-reducing  outcomes,  the costs of which  will  state  to devolve  some  of its power  in exchange  for
generally  fall disproportionately  on politically  financial  assistance  to meet  its immediate  needs,  such a
underrepresented  or powerless  groups.  crisis can  give rise to the emergence  of independent  legal,
Material  conditions  of agricultural  production  - such  political,  and economic  institutions  that  are maintained
as spatial  dispersion,  seasonal  work  cycles,  covariance  of  even once  the crisis has subsided.  External  actors  that
risk,  and  the associated  market  imperfections  - provide  resources  in terms  of crisis and  at the same  time
exacerbate  the difficulties  faced  by small  producers  to  enhance  the scope  for the  politically  least  vocal  parts  of
engage  in collective  action.  So,  despite  being generally  civil society  to participate  in political  discourse  can  have
the economically  most  efficient  form  of  production,  a significant  impact  in changing  policy.  The  paper
family  farmers'  ability  to counteract  the  political  discusses  in detail  the implications  for research  as well  as
influence  of rural  elites  and urban  dwellers  is extremely  for  policy  advice.
limited.  Lack of independent  institutions  and clearly
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose  this paper  is to describe  and,  as far as possible,  explain  variations
in policies, programs,  and institutions  that influence agricultural  growth, agrarian
relations,  and  rural  welfare  across  developing  countries  and over  time. It also identifies
conditions  under  which policy reforms meant  to bring about greater  efficiency  and
equity  are likely  to be initiated  and  sustained. In section  1, we briefly  describe  the key
variations  in policy,  agricultural  growth,  and rural  poverty  found  across  the developing
world. In subsequent  sections,  we explore  the  following  questions:
*  Why focus specifically  on agricultural  and agrarian  policies? We
examine  the material conditions  and missing markets that characterize  the farm
economy  in the developing  world  and show  how  these influence  the agrarian  structure
and institutional  environment  within which agricultural  production  takes place.  We
hypothesize  that the special characteristics  of the farm economy  also influence  a
country's  social  and political  environment,  and on the political  processes  that determine
key policies. If this hypothesis  is correct,  it provides  a strong  justification  for focusing
specifically  on agricultural  and  agrarian  policies.
*  How  do distorted  policy  patterns  affect  the efficiency  of agricultural
production  and  rural poverty?  We address  this second  set of background  questions
' Hans Binswanger is senior policy advisor  for agriculture and rural development and Klaus Deininger is an
economist at the World Bank.  We are grateful to Xinshen Diao for important back-ground work on general equilibrium
modeling and critical input on early ideas, and to Wendy Ayres for her role as a challenging and effective editor.  Yair
Mundlak and Lyn Squire made very helpful comments.  This paper is a greatly condensed version of a larger literature
review from which we had to exclude many valuable contributions and references.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions, are the authors'  own and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors,  or
any of its member countries.by summarizing  key conclusions  from  the literature  on the agricultural  supply  response
to various  policies,  and the resulting  impact  on productivity  growth. We also consider
how policy  distortions  coupled  with imperfect  and missing  markets,  and the unequal
distribution  of wealth act together to reduce efficiency.  With these background
elements  we are  able  to start  addressing  the  key  questions  explored  in  the paper.
*  What  explains  the observed  differences  in policies  across  countries
and over time?  Most  of the essay is devoted  to investigating  this issue. We look
beyond  agriculture  because  political  decisionmaking  involves  players  from all sectors.
We  review the  literature on  political decisionmaking,  and the  literature on  the
importance  of the  institutional  and  political  environment,  including  approaches  based  on
analyses  of class relations. Finally,  we try to understand  why so many developing
countries  adopted growth-reducing  agricultural  and agrarian policies, and why the
policies  have  been  so difficult  to reform.
*  What are the conditions  and circumstances  under which policy
reforms  are likely  to be initiated? Under  what conditions  would  policy  changes
lead to improvements  in efficiency  and/or reductions  in poverty? And under
what conditions  are the  reforms likely to  be sustained in  a  new political
equilibrium? /We  attempt  to answer these questions  and then examine  how the
factors  and theories  discussed  in this essay can help explain  why rapidly  growing  and
industrializing  economies,  such as those of East Asia, have stopped  discriminating
against  agriculture,  instead  giving  it a high  degree  of protection.
*  What  elements,  regularities,  and  theoretical  insights  emerging  from
the literature  reviewed  in this essay  are most  likely  to help  explain  the variations
in policies  across  countries  and over time?  How can they be used  to improve
policy  advice,  and policymaking  in developing  countries? We pursue  these two
questions  in  the concluding  section.
*  Then, we reflect on the future research  agenda and ask how the
elements  identified  in this literature  review  can be used  to build  and test an improved
political  economy  of agriculture  and  agrarian  relations.
21.1 Understanding  the theories  and  models.
A bewildering  variety of theories,  models,  and empirical  inquiries  have been
used  to address  these questions. We use Figure 1 as a map  to locate  the various
theories  and models,  and to structure  the essay. The oval in the middle  represents  a
country. Exogenous  influences  come  from nature  or from  other  countries,  and include
shocks  (S),  technology  options  (T),  ideas  (1),  and opportunities  for trade,  borrowing,  and
alliances  with  other  countries  (F).2
What  must  be explained  are the  variables  contained  in blocks  and  designated  by
capital  letters. Policy  outcomes  (X), which  include  variables  such  as the allocation  of
rights  of different  groups,  state  organizations,  and  public  expenditure  patterns,  influence
economic  outcomes  (Q), (such as flows and prices of output). Accumulation  alters
material  conditions  (M)-the quantity  and composition  of the capital  stock  and the labor
force, the distribution  of wealth, and the technology  of agricultural  production. The
political  environment  (P), including  the nature  of the state,  the power  of interest  groups,
or attitudes  and  ideologies,  influences  policy  outcomes.
Various  theories  and models,  denoted  by lower-case  Greek  letters,  explore  the
relationships  between  the variables. The models  include  static economic  models  (e),
accumulation  models  (a), behavioral  theories  (,B),  and political  decision  models  (7t).
Models  of political  economy  differ according  to the variables  (both endogenous  and
exogenous)  they  include  and  the behavioral  assumptions  they  employ.
2 Each of the symbols represents a multidimensional vector of similar variables.  For example, T refers to many
technologies.
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ScienceFigure  1 can be summarized  in the equations  below. All variables  and parameters
are multidimensional  vectors. The  endogenous  variables  appear  as dependent  variables  in
some equations  and independent  variables  in others.  In empirical  investigations,  this
makes it difficult to establish  causality.  We briefly comment  on this problem in the
discussion  of the research  agenda.
Q=Q(M,X,F,  SIC)  (1)
AM=AM(Q,X,  M, T  a)  (2)
P = P  (M,  X,  p)  (3)
AX=AX(X,  P, M, Q,Fl)  (4)
Static  economic  models  (E)  relate  political  outcomes  (X) and material  conditions  (M)
to economic  outcomes  (Q),  such as the composition  of production,  prices,  macroeconomic
conditions,  and the distribution  of income  across  factor owners. These models  may be
partial  or general  equilibrium,  microeconomic  or macroeconomic,  optimizing  or mechanical.
They  generally  treat  policies  as exogenous.
Accumulation  models  (a) relate  economic  outcomes  (Q) to their long-run  impact  on
material  conditions  (AM). Some accumulation  models examine how investment,  factor
mobility,  or natural  resource  exploitation  affect material  conditions. Others  try to explain
how population  density,  ease  of market  access,  or the capital-labor  ratio  in an economy  is
related  to innovation  and adoption  of new agricultural  technology.  These  models  take the
political  environment  and policy  outcomes  as exogenous.  Accumulation  models  have  been
used  extensively  to analyze  and  estimate  the economic  and social  cost of the distortionary
policies  described  above.
Behavioral  theories (J3)  relate material  conditions  (M) to the social and political
environment  within  which  political  decisions  are made. Theories  of collective  action  relate
the ability of  interest groups (which are exogenously  given) to  influence economic
5endowments,  material conditions,  and their access to,  and  ability to  make use of
information.  Analyses  of institutional  economics,  historical  materialism,  and a large  body  of
historical  literature  relate  the  formation,  nature,  and  behavior  of states  to material  conditions
of production  and prior political  outcomes. All the behavioral  models  assume  that self-
interest  explains  the participation  of actors  in economics  or politics,  and the specific  policy
objectives  they pursue.
Models  of political  decisionmaking  (7c)  relate  elements  of the political  environment,  to
specific  policy  outcomes,  and  the economic  consequences  of such  policies. They consider
the behavior  of political  actors  (benevolent  dictators  who  maximize  a social  welfare  function,
autocratic  self-interested  decisionmakers,  interest  groups)  and the nature  of voting rules
and  mechanisms.
2.  THE  MAIN  PATTERNS  OF  POLICY,  AGRICULTURAL  GROWTH  AND  RURAL
POVERTY
Global agricultural  output has grown faster than food demand for more than a
century. Over  the same  period  the proportion  of the population  deriving  a livelihood  from
agriculture has declined, real food prices have fallen, and-in  many countries-the
proportion  of rural  households  living  in poverty  has fallen  (World  Bank  1990  and 1996). But,
there  has  been  great  variation  among  countries  and regions  in output,  productivity,  and rural
welfare,  with some  experiencing  large  improvements  and others  experiencing  stagnating  or
even  declining  output,  productivity,  and rural  living standards. These  variations  and their
relationship  to government  policies  and  other  factors  must  be explained.
Agricultural  policies in developing  countries are often highly distorted, as  the
literature  documents.  Krueger,  Schiff,  and Vaides  (1991),  in characterizing  policy  mixes  for
eighteen  countries  from  1960  to 1983,  found  that:
*Most  of the countries  imposed  high  taxes  on their  agricultural  sectors.
.The indirect  tax on agriculture  from  macroeconomic  policies,  such  as overvalued  exchange
rates,  and measures  such  as import  duties  and industrial  protection,  was three  times
the  direct  tax, such  as export  taxes,  on agriculture.
6*Most of the direct measures  were contrary to the country's long-term comparative
advantage-for example,  competitive  commodities  were taxed, while uncompetitive
(often  food)  crops  were  protected.
*Resources provided to  agriculture,  through measures such  as  subsidized credit,
infrastructure,  research  and  extension,  were  not  equal  to resources  extracted.
oThe resources  that did flow to agriculture  almost exclusively  benefited  large, modern
enterprises,  not the many small  farmers  who, together  with landless  workers,  were
most  affected  by the net  taxation  of agriculture.
Still, among the eighteen countries included in the study, performance  of the
agricultural  sector  in terms  of growth  and poverty  reduction  varied  widely  depending  on the
country's  agrarian  structure,  macroeconomic  environment,  and provision  of public  goods  to
the farming  sector. The countries  fall into four main  groups,  depending  on their agrarian
structures  and  the  policies  they pursued.
First, based  on an agrarian  structure  consisting  predominantly  of family farms,  the
major  Southeast  Asian countries-Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and Thailand,  following  the earlier
lead of Taiwan and Republic  of Korea-and  China reduced  agricultural  taxation in the
1970s  and started  to support  smallholders. These  countries,  in addition  to establishing
favorable macroeconomic  policies, invested  in rural infrastructure  and social services,
provided  research  and  extension  services,  and  supported  viable  smaliholder  credit  systems.
Agricultural  output  grew rapidly,  and the number  of rural households  living in poverty  fell
dramatically.  The experience  of China illustrates  the enormous  impact  that agrarian  and
agricultural  policies  have  on agricultural  output  and productivity.  In 1978  China  abandoned
collective  agriculture;  assigned  most agricultural  land to families,  giving  each  a very small
holding;  and sharply  increased  the prices  paid  for agricultural  goods. Over  the next  fifteen
years  farm  output  grew  at a rate of more  than  6 percent  a year. This dramatic  increase  in
agricultural  productivity  precipitated  China's  long-running  economic  boom,  which  continues
today.
A  second group of  countries,  including Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda,  Zambia,  and many  other  African  countries,  also had  agrarian  structures  dominated
7by family-farms.  However these countries discriminated heavily against agriculture by
maintaining overvalued exchange rates,  industrial protection, and  export taxation.  In
addition, they provided little support to agriculture, and the support they did provide went
primarily  to relatively inefficient, but politically powerful large producers.  Except in regions
with especially favorable agricultural conditions, agricultural output has not kept up with
population growth, and  rural poverty has increased sharply.  Although many of  these
countries have  recently  initiated macroeconomic stabilization programs and  structural
reforms, they are reforming  agricultural  policies, with some notable  exceptions, only slowly.
A third group of countries-including  India, Kenya, Mexico, and the Philippines-with
agrarian structures that comprise large estates formed during colonial rule also imposed
heavy taxes on the agricultural  sector through unfavorable  policies,  such as an unsupportive
regulatory environment, dominance of parastatals, exchange rate restrictions, and import
barriers.  But these countries also partially compensated for these unfavorable policies by
implementing large public investment programs in  rural areas  and  partial land  reform
programs, which addressed structural problems. This combination of policies has resulted
in modest increases in agricultural output and modest reductions in rural poverty.  Rent
seeking by large farmers and bureaucrats has, however, often reduced the efficiency of
public spending, which has steadily shifted from investment in public goods (for example,
irrigation) to  distortionary subsidies for  privately used inputs  (for  example, water  and
electricity), eroding the basis for long-term growth.  Reforms of these public expenditure
patterns have begun only recently and are being implemented  slowly.
A  fourth group of  countries-including  Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and  South
Africa-has  been characterized  by a very unequal distribution  of land-with  Gini coefficients
that are uniformly higher than 0.8 (often with 2 percent of farmers holding 33 percent of the
land)that  dates back to colonial  times., The unequal  distribution of land was worsened by
a  policy mix that  taxed the agricultural sector directly and  indirectly through industrial
protection  and overvalued  exchange rates. To compensate, rural elites were favored in the
I The Gini coefficient measures  the degree of  inequality in a  distribution.  A  Gini coefficient  of zero  implies a
perfectly equal distribution whereas a coefficient of 1 implies perfect unequal distribution, with one unit holding everything and
all others holding nothing.
8allocation  of property  rights,  public investment,  services,  credit,  and subsidies. Although
governments  sometimes  made  efforts  to redistribute  land in response  to rural unrest  and
violence,  the programs  were poorly  designed  and consequently  achieved  little.  To the
contrary,  because  they  discouraged  tenancy  (by  restricting  property  rights  or by raising  fear
among  landowners  of future land reform),  or explicitly  prohibited  tenancy,  the land reform
programs  often led to the evictions  of large numbers  of tenant farmers,  whose loss of
income  more  often  than  not  outweighed  the  gains  achieved  by poor  farmers.
Although  agricultural  output  grew  rapidly  in these  countries  until  the mid-1980s,  rural
employment  did not grow enough to keep up with population  growth-because by
subsidizing  credit, governments  encouraged  large farmers  to purchase  farm machinery,
which displaced  labor.  Agricultural  growth largely stopped after governments  stopped
subsidizing  credit in the mid-1980s  with the onset  of the fiscal and debt crises. Structural
problems,  manifested  in widespread  rural poverty and rural violence, again demand
attention.
3.  IMPLICATIONS  OF  MATERIAL  CONDITIONS  AND  MISSING  MARKETS
It is impossible  to consider  the consequences  of agricultural  policies  in isolation  from
general  macroeconomic  conditions  and  policies  affecting  other  sectors. But it makes  sense
to investigate  the key factors  influencing  agricultural  policies  separately,  since  the material
conditions  of agricultural  production  and the specific  imperfections  of financial,  insurance,
and factor  markets  in rural  areas  can explain  many  observed  regularities.4  We first identify
the special characteristics  of agricultural  production  and their consequences. We then
investigate  the way policies  interact  with market  imperfections  to produce  efficiency-  and
growth-reducing  outcomes. Finally,  we explore  whether  and how material  conditions  can
help  explain  policy  choices  and  distortions.
4 This section  draws  heavily  from the large literature  on tenancy  and sharecropping  recently  reviewed  for the Journal
of Economic  Literature  by Otsuka et al. (1992) and the literature on agrarian relations and land markets  as reviewed  by
Binswanger,  Deininger  and Feder (1995). As the purpose of this section is to set the scene rather than provide a detailed
discussion,  we refer the interested  reader  to these  references  for a more  elaborate  argument  and a borader  set of citations.
93.1 Material  conditions  of agricultural  production
Agricultural  production  is characterized  by heterogeneity,  seasonality,  and spatial
dispersion,  and by large  variations  in weather  and  prices  that affect  similar  producers  within
a region  in the same  way-  implying  that their  incomes  are covariant.  These  characteristics
aggravate the  problems caused by  well-known informational asymmetries which
characterize  contracts for insurance,  credit, and labor.  Covariance  and informational
asymmetries,  have major  consequences  for financial  and insurance  markets:  crops  usually
cannot  be insured  against  loss  (Hazell,  Valdes,  and Pomareda  1986),  and rural financial
intermediation  and credit markets  develop  slowly  and  with great difficulty  (Binswanger  and
Rosenzweig  1986).  Spatial dispersion,  heterogeneity,  and seasonality  imply that hired
labor,  which  does not share  in profits,  must  be closely  supervised-and supervision  costs
are  exceptionally  high.  s
These  special  features  of rural  areas  give rise to three main  consequences.  First,
many of the institutions  in rural areas have developed  in response  to specific material
conditions  and the resulting  imperfections  in financial, insurance, and labor markets.
Second,  fully privatized  land rights may not be the most efficient  arrangement  for rural
economies  that are characterized  by highly  incomplete  markets. Third, the way in which
rights  to productive  assets,  especially  land,  are allocated  affects  not  only the distribution  of
income  in rural  areas,  but  also  the  overall  efficiency  of the rural  economy.
3.2 Adaptations  to missing  and  incomalete  markets
Missing  or incomplete  markets  can explain many of the characteristics  of rural
societies.6  Subsistence  orientation,  reliance  on family  labor,  and the use of land and cattle
(or other assets)  as savings  instruments  can be explained  as the consequence  of the
I  Empirical evidence regarding the supervision costs of agricultural labor can be found in Dong and Dow (1993) and
in Frisvold (1994).  Imperfections in financial markets, especially if coupled with impediments to the functioning of the land
rental market, can counter this advantage and may,  in practice,  still lead to the appearance of a positive relationship between
farm size and yields (see, for example, Kevane 1996).
6  Some  analysts have argued that  peasants  do not  maximize  profits.  This  controversy  over  a distinct  "peasant
rationality"  has largely disappeared,  and peasant behavior is now modeled as utility-maximizing in settings characterized by
high risk and imperfect markets.
10absence,  or poor development  of markets  for products,  labor,  finance,  and risk diffusion
(Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  1986,  Binswanger  and McIntire  1987).
Agrarian  structure. Many  studies  of farming  systems  around  the world  have  shown
that there  are few  economies  of scale  in agriculture  that might  provide  advantages  to farms
larger  than  what  a family  could  operate  using  its own labor  (van  Zyl, et al. 1995).7  The lack
of economies  of scale  in agriculture,  coupled  with the high  cost of supervising  wage  labor,
implies  that a farm cultivated  by an owner-operator  without  reliance  on permanent  outside
labor-the family  farm-is  the most  efficient  unit of production.  The few exceptions  occur
with plantation  crops, or where large farms are able to overcome  imperfections  in other
markets,  such  as those  for outputs,  inputs,  or credit.8
The  degree  to which  covariate  and  noncovariate  risk  can  be diversified  has  important
implications  for equity as well as productive  efficiency. Where markets  are not well-
integrated,  prices  can vary  considerably  in response  to covariate  shocks  such  as droughts,
leading  to distress  sales of assets at very low prices. Such sales leave  the seller with
insufficient  resources  to purchase  the assets  back later  when  prices  return  to normal  (Cain
1981). These  circumstances  can lead to the concentration  of land holdings  even where
large  holdings  are less  efficient  than  family  farms. The inability  to insure  against  the risk  of
loss  can lead  to the use of assets  such  as draft  animals  to facilitate  consumption  smoothing
during  periods  of crisis  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  1993).
'  The optimal scale of family farms varies widely ammong  and within countries, depending  on climate and soil
fertility,  population  density, access  to markets  and infrastrucutre,  the opportunity  cost of family  workers and operators in the
urban  economy,  and the technology  available.
8 Many technical  economies  of scale  can be circumvented  by rental  markets  for machines. Other  economies  of scale
in marketing  and credit can be circumvented  by village traders, cooperative  societies, and contract farming.  Managerial
economies  of scale can be circumvented  by extension  services or cooperatives. Thus the worldwide  prevalence  of the family
farm suggests  that the superior incentives  of family members  to invest and work hard typically  dominate these sources of
economies  of scale.  Exceptions  can occur with plantation  crops.  These are characterized  by the occurrence  of economies  of
scale in processing  or shipping  a highly  perishable  crop, which leads to a coordination  problem between the farm and the
plantation. This problem can be solved either by combining  the two operations  in a single enterprise,  or through contract
farming. Thus  we see very large  farms  producing  sugarcane,  bananas  for export, tea, and palmoil. For all these commodities
the share of output  from plantations  has declined  in recent decades  compared  with the share  from contract  farming  (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig  1986). Another  exception  occurs  when there are virtually  no markets  for inputs, outputs and credit, as has
been the case in transition economies.  Families are then understandably  reluctant to bear the risks of private farming,
preferring  the safety  of producing  as part of large enterprises  that can  provide  some  of these  services.
1  1Sharecropping  can be viewed  as a way  to allocate  land  to efficient  family  operators
in places  with unequally  distributed  landownership,  high  environmental  risk, and imperfect
credit markets. Although  a less efficient  system  of production  than owner operation  or
fixed-rent  tenancy,  sharecropping  provides  tenants  with partial  incentives  to work hard  and
invest,  which  wage  labor  contracts  do not.s
Social  characteristics.  Characteristics  such  as the role of elders  in the management
of production  and food  stocks  for large  extended  families  have  similarly  been explained  as
adaptations  to high environmental  risk, low population  density,  and the ensuing  isolation
from  interregional  markets  (Meillassoux  1981). Spatially  diversified  social  networks,  created
and maintained  through  migration  and marriage,  help insure against  covariate  risks and
prevail  as long as less costly  mechanisms  to insure  against such risks are unavailable
(Rosenzweig  and  Stark  1989).
In many  cases,  however,  farmers  are forced  to resort  to second-best  strategies-not
because  of the unalterable  material  characteristics  of the productive  environment  and the
associated  market  imperfections,  but because  of government  policies. The patron-client
relationship  is an instructive  example,  being considered  a relatively  beneficial  insurance-
substitute  in the neoclassical  tradition,  but  as a sophisticated  form  of exploitation  in Marxist
theories (Hayami and Kikuchi 1984; Scott 1976; Bhaduri 1986).  Determining  which
interpretation  is valid  requires  an examination  of the policy  and institutional  framework  within
which  these  relationships  are  adopted.1o
9 Numerous  empirical studies have shown that legal prohibition of sharecropping as  "feudal"  does not lead to the
choice of fixed-rent tenancy, but rather to further restrictions in small farmers'  access to land (see Binswanger, Deininger, and
Feder  1995).  Restrictions then  lead to further  efficiency losses and increased poverty,  as  in the group of  countries  with
dualistic  land  ownership  patterns.  Sadoulet,  Fukui,  and  de  Janvry  (1994)  are  unable  to  find  a  significant  effect  of
sharecropping, compared with owner-operators, for sharecroppers who are poor,  face high risk, or have established long-term
relationships with their landlords.  Shaban (1987), who through the use of panel data adjusts not only for soil quality but also
for individual ability, finds that the efficiency loss attributable to share tenancy is modest: about 15 percent.
'° In the United States south the need to maintain a loyal and cheap labor force led large landowners to actively and
fiercely  resist attempts to replace a paternalistic system,  under which they provided some insurance and protection  to their
employees, with systems giving workers access to state-provided benefits such as social security.  Not until the invention of the
cotton picker,  which mechanized the cotton harvest, was social security extended to the south (Alston and Ferrie  1993).
123.3 Implications  for the  evolution  of property  rights
Property  rights  assign  the rights to and rewards  from resource  use to individuals,
thus providing  incentives  to invest in resources  and use them efficiently  (Alchian and
Demsetz  1972). Given  the  high  cost  of supervising  wage  labor,  clearly  allocating  land  rights
to owner-operators  would  generally  increase  the  efficiency  of agricultural  production.
However,  in environments  where  information  costs  are high and markets  for finance
and insurance  are imperfect,  private  property rights do not always produce the most
efficient farming arrangements. Abandoning  communal  land rights for fully tradable
property  rights may lead to the loss of safety  nets for the poor,  the use of economies  of
scale in herding,  or measures  to diversify  risk (Jodha 1992;  Nugent  and Sanchez  1993;
McCloskey  1991). Furthermore,  the process  of assigning  and transferring  private  property
rights is not cost-free. The costs of maintaining  records,  negotiating,  contracting,  and
policing  property  rights  can be high  and  may  exceed  the  value  of the land,  especially  in rural
areas  with  low  population  densities  and little  market  access.
Communal  types of land tenure assign to community  members  clear inheritable
userights  to cropland,  pastures,  forests,  and fisheries,  and usually  allow some degree  of
exchange  (rental  or even  sale of land)  within  the  community.  They often  provide  security  of
tenure  at low cost, and thus do not discourage  individuals  from investing  in the operation
(Migot-Adholla,  et al. 1991;  Bruce  and Migot-Adholla  1994). Since  the use of the land  and
its output  belong  to individual  cultivators,  communal  property  rights  systems  rarely  lead to
large static efficiency  losses-unlike collective  farming systems.11  Fully individualized
property rights systems become  superior to communal  systems only once population
growth  and specialization  increase  the value  of land and the efficiency  losses  associated
with  restricting  transactions  to insiders.
" The supervision and monitoring cost advantages of family farms  seem to be at the root  of the preponderance of
assignments of land to, and production by,  individual families. Collective production of crops  is very rare, and cropland  is
almost always assigned to families on a temporary or  permanent basis.  Communal use is usually restricted to noncropped
forest or pasture areas.
133.4  Efficiency  implications of the initial asset distribution
It is well known that in many countries land prices exceed the capitalized value of
farm profits (Binswanger, Deininger  and Feder 1995).  In periurban areas, where land has
many alternative uses, this is not surprising.  Yet the phenomenon is prevalent even far
from cities, because, in addition to the profit stream available from farming, land provides
other services to  the owner, which are capitalized into land prices.  Where insurance
markets are  imperfect (because of  the  combination of  covariance and  moral  hazard
problems), land provides value as collateral.  Land provides additional services, serving as
an inflation hedge, a tax shelter (due to the preferential treatment of agriculture in income
and property tax systems), and collateral to obtain access to subsidized credit (Just and
Miranowski  1989; Brandao  and Rezende 1989; van Schalkwyk  and van Zyl 1996).
Where land prices exceed the present value of their income streams, poor farmers
cannot buy land, even if they have access to credit at the prevailing  interest rate. To pay for
the land with a loan, poor farmers must reduce their consumption below what they can
sustain as workers or sharecroppers.  Or, they have to use nonfarm income to service a
part of the debt even in normal years.  Thus people need savings or nonfarm income to
acquire land. And this need tends to make the distribution of land holdings more unequal.
Even without macroeconomic  instability  or policy distortions, rural land markets have
special characteristics. Where nonagricultural opportunities  for rural residents are limited,
little land is offered for sale during periods when the weather is normal.  Landowners are
made better off by selling land only if they are able to earn a higher return from the sales
proceeds than from cultivation or  rental.12 Therefore, rural land sales are likely to  be
concentrated in years when profits are low because of adverse weather or low commodity
prices, and take the form of distress sales.  Since farmers in the same area are affected by
the same conditions, the sales will often be to  moneylenders or  other creditors whose
'2  Mortgaged land cannot be used as collateral for working capital.  Thus the owner of mortgaged land cannot reap
the production advantage of ownership, and thus will be unable to repay the loan out of increased income from the land.  Only
unmortgaged land yields a flow of income and other services, the present value of which equals the land price (Feder et  al,
1988) Since only unmortgaged land provides these services, land purchases are likely to be financed out of household savings.
14assets are  their outstanding  loans.,a  Thus even without macroeconomic  or  policy
distortions,  land holdings  may become  concentrated  in the hands  of moneylenders,  large
landowners,  people  with urban  incomes,  or others  with  financial  resources.
Does  this matter  for efficiency? Land rental  or sharecropping  could equalize  the
marginal  product  of land,  labor,  and capital  in production  among  land holdings. But these
contracts  are second-best  adaptations  to market  imperfections  and are still less efficient
than owner-operated  farms.  The initial distribution  of land or wealth will thus influence
subsequent  allocation  of factors  of production  and has important  consequences  for the long-
term productive  capacity  of the rural  economy. Moral  hazard,  covariance  of income,  and
collateral  value  of land imply  absent  insurance  and imperfect  credit markets. Markets  for
land may therefore  fail to bring about Pareto-improving  trades and an efficient  farm size
distribution-an illustration  of the  second-best.
The  powerful impact of  initial  land  allocations on  subsequent agricultural
development  can be illustrated  by comparing  land  allocations  in the United  States  West  and
in Brazil  in the late nineteenth  century. In the United  States  the Homesteading  Acts limited
the size of plots that families  could acquire  to 160 acres.  To retain ownership  rights,
individuals  were required  to cultivate  the plots for a specified  number  of years.  Owner-
operated  farms  dominated  agricultural  production,  with rentals  and sales  merely  reallocating
land to more efficient farm families  working plots of comparable  size.  United States
agriculture  became  one  of the most  productive  systems  in  the world,  and  remains  so today.
By contrast,  in most  of Brazil  land could  be titled  only in lots no smaller  than four square
kilometers  (988 acres)-an area much larger  than a family could work.  Restrictions  on
subdivision kept landownership  highly concentrated.  As  a  consequence,  Brazilian
agriculture  became  dependent  on wage labor and was characterized  by relatively  low
efficiency and investment.  Investment  and productivity  rose only after government-
sponsored import substitution policies and  credit  subsidies brought about  rapid
1' These financial intermediaries retain the property in their portfolios,  sometimes renting it to the very farmers who
sold it, until land prices improve with the return of normal weather.
15capitalization  of the sector.  Land sales have been unable  to reduce significantly  the
inequality  in the  size  distribution  of holdings.14
3.5 Adaptations  to unequal  land  ownership  distributions
Because  supervising  hired labor is costly, large farms run with hired labor will
generally  be less efficient  than small  farms and will not be able to offer owner-operators
sufficiently  aftractive  contract  terms  to induce  them  to give up  their own operations. In the
past,  where  population  densities  were low, large estates  therefore  faced severe  problems
recruiting  workers  or tenant-farmers.  Policies  were  often adopted  to reduce  the profits  of
family farms and therefore  the reservation  utilities of their operators.  These policies
included  eliminating  rights  over  high  quality  land;  prohibiting  the  subdivision  of large  estates;
imposing  lump-sum  taxes  on individuals,  huts,  and labor;  restricting  the  marketing  of output;
and prohibiting  the production  of lucrative  crops  (see  section  5.2  for further  discussion).  In
many countries these policies remained  in  place even after population growth had
eliminated  labor  shortages.  They  contributed  to inefficiency,  stagnation,  and rural  poverty.
Two predominant  types  of arrangements  arose  to reduce  the inefficiencies  of very
unequal  ownership  distribution  of land. First,  in landlord  estate  systems  owners  leased  their
land to tenants who worked the land with their family's labor.  Most commonly,  the
arrangement  was sharecropping,  a second-best  adaptation  to the material  conditions  and
market imperfections  of  agriculture.  Most landlord estate systems have now been
eliminated  through  land reform  programs. Obtaining  title to the land  they worked  provided
former tenants with incentives  and resources  to invest in physical and human capital,
greater  security  against  exogenous  shocks,  and often an increased  ability  to participate  in
the  political  process  (Grabowski  1994).
Second,  in hacienda  systems  characteristic  of many South American  and African
countries,  tenants  were  allocated  just enough  land  to satisfy  their  subsistence  requirements
14 Not only were financial and insurance markets absent or distorted, during the twentieth century a combination of
macroeconomic instability, tax preferences  for agriculture, and credit subsidies for large farmers drove  land prices above the
present  value of  farm  profits,  further  reducing the  ability of  the  sales  market to  bring about  an  efficient distribution  of
operational holdings (Binswanger and Elgin 1988; Brandao and Rezende 1989).
16but  were required  to work on the owner's  part  of the farm, usually  to produce  crops  for the
market.  These  systems  were not  only less efficient  than landlord  estates,  but also evolved
less  favorably  (de  Janvry  1981). Land  reforms,  where  they occurred,  often  resulted  in state-
farm or  collective-farm  structures,  which provide very poor incentives for work and
investment,  and rarely  lead  to increases  in productivity.  In most places,  however,  the fear
of impending  land reform  prompted  landowners  to reduce  their dependence  on hired or
tenant labor through  large-scale  evictions.  Owners  then either mechanized  their farm
operations,  often  with the help  of generous  government  subsidies,  or converted  their  farms
to undertake  extensive livestock ranching,  which requires very little labor.  In many
countries,  with so many rural laborers  unemployed,  wages for all unskilled  workers  fell,
worsening  rural  and  urban  poverty.
In the remainder  of the paper we will often refer to the special material and
informational  characteristics  of agriculture;  the difficulties  with output,  labor,  financial,  and
insurance  markets  that they imply,  and  how  they  change  in the  course  of development.  We
have seen that they are very important  influences  on the organization  of production,
peasant  behavior,  and the interaction  among  the allocation  of property  rights,  contractual
freedoms,  and  the efficiency  of production.  It would  not be surprising  to observe  that these
conditions  also affect  accumulation  processes,  such as technical  change,  and the political
environment  within  which  policies  are  decided.
4. The impact  of policies on accumulation
In order to appreciate  the full impact of the policy patterns  discussed  in the first
section  on rural  growth  and  welfare,  it is necessary  to understand  the impact  of policies  on
accumulation:  investment  in physical  and human  capital,  the conservation  and sustainable
use of natural  resources,  and the pace  and direction  of technical  change. Accumulation
processes  depend  on the provision  of complementary  public  goods  and infrastructure,  and
may therefore be influenced  by the quantity and quality of public goods provided to
agriculture  and rural  areas. The prevalence  of market  imperfections  in rural  areas,  and  the
far-reaching  effects  these have  on incentives  and abilities  to accumulate  will increase  the
17importance  of initial asset distributions  in determining  agricultural  productivity  and rural
poverty.
4.1 Supply  response  and  productivity  growth
Sustained  growth  of agricultural  productivity  is contingent  on the generation  of new
technologies  through  research  and investment  in human  and physical  capital-fostered by a
policy  environment  that provides  private  agents  with incentives  to engage  in  these activities.
Policies that  discriminate against the  agricultural sector will  thus  have long-term
consequences  for agricultural  growth  and  rural  poverty,  in addition  to their  static  effects.
One reason  why it has been  easy to adopt  policies  that discriminate  against  all or
part of the agricultural  sector  is that the  short-run  supply  response  of aggregate  agricultural
output  is inelastic,  much  more  so than  that of other  sectors  (Johnston  1  960).l5  This inelastic
supply  response  allows  myopic  politicians  to implement  agricultural  policies  without  being
fully  aware  of, or concerned  about  their  ultimate  deleterious  effects  on supply  and  growth.
While  the  short-run  supply  response  of agriculture  is inelastic,  the long-run  response
is highly  elastic,  as the literature  unambiguously  shows.16  The literature  also shows  that the
agricultural  sector  adjusts  to changes  in the intersectoral  terms  of trade  through  individual
investment  and migration  decisions  that have  relatively  long gestation  periods. In the long
term declines  in the rate of investment  will reduce  the rate of change  in the implemented
technology  used,  thus reducing  productivity  and growth  (Mundlak,  Cavallo,  and Domenech
1989).  Policies  thus have much larger and far-reaching  long-term  consequences  than
implied  in comparative  static  models.
Boserup  (1965)  describes  in great detail  the ways in which population  growth  has
historically  led societies  to invest  in land improvements  and irrigation  facilities,  to intensify
land use, and to adopt new technologies  that resulted  in higher  sustainable  agricultural
IS  This is because many of the factors of production are highly sector-specific and therefore  not very mobile in the
short run.
16 The  inelastic short-run supply response  of the agricultural  sector  is not  a result  of  inherent  backwardness  or
irrationally backward-bending supply curves that would allow the state to extract almost unlimited "vent for surplus"  without
affecting long-term productivity, as was long believed by Marxist scholars.
18production  per unit of land.  But, not all societies  experiencing  population  growth and
increased  market  access  have shown  growth  in agricultural  productivity,  suggesting  that
these  responses  are not automatic. Policies  discriminating  against  agriculture,  or parts of
the farm economy,  for example,  small  farmers,  are likely  to slow  the evolution  of farming
systems.  Take  for instance  the cases  of Kenya  and  Ethiopia  (Heath  and Binswanger  1996).
In Kenya  (Machakos  District),  farmers  enjoyed  secure  land rights,  access  to infrastructure
and markets,  fairly  favorable  terms  of trade,  and cash  income  from sales  of crops  or labor.
A fourfold  increase  in the rural  population  over  sixty  years  was more  than compensated  for
by output  growth  and investment  in land  conservation.  Ethiopia,  on the other  hand,  lacked
the  institutions,  policies,  and  infrastructure  favorable  to farmer  investment.  A national  cross-
section  showed  that  high  population  density  is associated  with  soil degradation.
Getting policies right is even more important  for agriculture  that uses modern
technology,  since  the growth  of total  factor  productivity  can  take place  in  different  ways. By
responding  to factor scarcities,  induced  technical  change  is directed  toward  products  or
factors  that are most  efficient  for a particular  economy  (Hayami  and  Ruttan  1985).17  If factor
prices are distorted,  technical  change may not occur or may be inappropriate  for the
economy,  given  its  factor ratios. Either  would  have  negative  implications  for efficiency  and
growth.
4.2 Public  investment
It has long been  known  that the potential  returns  to private  investment,  and thus its
attractiveness  will be affected not only by  price policies but also by complementary
investment in  public goods, such  as  education, infrastructure,  basic science, and
dissemination  of technology.  However,  despite long-standing  empirical  evidence  that
strongly  suggests  public  investment  in these  areas  generate  high returns,  the patterns  of
" The induced-innovation hypothesis remains controversial, despite the large body of historical evidence that supports
it, especially from agriculture.  It is felt that the theory lacks a solid macroeconomic foundation, despite the fact that  such a
foundation has existed  for  more  than  twenty  years.  In  addition,  many have argued  that  it  is empirically  impossible to
distinguish between ordinary factor substitution and biases in technical change (Diamond,  McFadden,  ansd Rodriguez  1978).
This is so even though the problem has been resolved theoretically by Sato (1970) and empirically by Binswanger (1974) for
the United  States,  using panel data to estimate the underlying substitution parameters  and then  applying these to aggregate
historical data to compute the factor biases residually.  For a recent discussion of the controversy,  see Ruttan (forthcoming).
19public spending  observed  in many developing  countries  are not oriented  appropriately.
Many countries  still neglect primary education,  especially  in rural areas, and provide
disproportional  subsidies  to higher  education  that benefit  the better-off  (Schultz  1988;  van
de Walle  and Nead  1995). A large  number  of studies  have  consistently  found  exceptionally
high  returns to  publicly-funded  agricultural research.  Despite increases in  public
expenditures  in developing  countries  on agricultural  research,  studies  suggest  that rates  of
return to agricultural  research  (Evenson  and Westphal  1995)  and smaliholder  extension
(Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and  Feder  1991)  are  still  well  above  those  for  other
investments-suggesting  that countries  continue  to underinvest.
While skimping  on these high-return  investments,  governments  have often spent
large amounts  on nonproductive  activities  with low returns,  such as untargeted  producer
and consumer  subsidies.  The literature  describing  urban  bias (Lipton  1977,  1993)  provides
qualitative  evidence  that government  investment  has often favored  the rural elite and the
urban  upper  and middle  classes  rather  than  the small  family  operator.  A number  of recent
studies  investigating  returns  to public  investment  in different  sectors  demonstrate  that public
investment  in many developing  countries is focused on sectors,  such as state-owned
enterprises  and large-scale  agriculture,  in which state involvement  may crowd out private
investment. These investments  have not, for the most part, brought  about significantly
higher  growth,  and may  even  have  reduced  growth  (Easterly  and Rebelo  1993;  Devarajan,
Swaroop  and  Zou 1996).
4.3 Credit  market  imperfections  and  asset  distribution
In the presence  of information  deficiencies  individuals  lacking  wealth  for collateral
may be unable  to purchase  or lease indivisible  assets. They are unable  to borrow,  not
because  they are intrinsically  less productive,  but because  the agency cost (the cost of
supervision  and  monitoring)  of lending  to them is prohibitive  (Hoff  and Lyon  1994).1"  These
problems  are particularly  severe  in rural, as compared  to urban,  areas, where imperfect
Is Local lenders can acquire information about the creditworthiness of their borrowers  and the risks associated with
the projects  undertaken by them at  relatively little  cost.  Their ability to diffuse risk  is,  however,  very limited.  Thus the
transaction costs  associated with loans for  agriculture  are  high (because  of  the high reserve  ratios  required) even  in  the
informal sector, as confirmed by a large number of empirical studies.
20insurance  markets, spatial dispersion  and covariant  incomes add to the difficulties  of
obtaining  access  to credit.
The theoretical  literature  suggests  that in the presence  of credit market  constraints
and indivisible  investments,  the initial  distribution  of wealth  affects  aggregate  output and
investment  in the short run and the long run.  Different  initial distributions  of assets  are
associated  with very different, but dynamically  stable steady states (Chatterjee  1991;
Tsiddon  1992). Societies  in which  a relatively  equal initial distribution  of assets  allows  a
large  number  of individuals  to make  lumpy  investments  that enhance  productivity  may  reach
permanently  higher  rates  of growth  than those in which  the highly  unequal  distribution  of
assets  prevents  such  investment.  This outcome  has several  implications  that are important
for agrarian  relations  and rural  welfare.
First, if schooling  effectively  compensates  for capital  market imperfections,  then a
policy  of compulsory  education  could  generate  high  social  payoffs,  in addition  to producing
21immediate  gains  in productivity.19  A policy  requiring  schooling  could  make  the  distribution  of
income  more  equal  and lead to permanently  higher  economic  growth  (Eckstein  and Zilcha
1994).
Second,  policies  that facilitate  consumption  smoothing  in risky environments  may
positively  affect on productivity  by eliminating  producers'  need  to liquidate  their stocks of
productive  assets,  such as draft animals  or land, at distressed-prices  (Rosenzweig  and
Wolpin  1993;  Cain  1981).
Third, allocating public expenditures  to urban areas or  large farmers who are
politically  vocal-practices that have been widely  followed in developing  countries-does
not help  the rural  poor  gain  access  to credit. Rather,  it undermines  their ability  to operate
as family farmers,  therefore  increasing  inequality,  and also reduces  productivity  and long-
run  growth  (Bencivenga  and  Smith  1991).
Fourth,  where  rural  capital  markets  are highly  imperfect  and  the distribution  of wealth
is unequal,  a one-time  redistribution  of wealth,  such  as a land  reform,  may largely  eliminate
the need  for distortionary  redistributive  policies  later. More  importantly,  it may  also alter  the
equilibrium  growth  path of the economy  and lead to permanently  higher  levels  of growth
(Banerjee  and Newman  1993;  Chatterjee  1991). This outcome  is consistent  with the land
reform  experience  in East  Asia  and suggests  that,  despite  the greater  difficulties  of carrying
out land  reform  in the remaining  hacienda  systems  (see  section  2.4),  doing  so would likely
generate  considerable  social  benefits.
Given their impact on accumulation  processes,  the welfare and equity costs of
distortionary  agricultural  policies  are likely  to be very large. Why  are such  policies  adopted?
Why  do they  persist?  Why  have  so many  countries  persistently  pursued  agricultural  policies
and expenditure  patterns  that inhibit efficiency  and growth,  waste natural  resources,  and
harm  large  segments  of their  populations?  And  why have  the people  who are made  worse
19 One example  would be  to counteract  the  market imperfections  with a  government loan  scheme that  finances
primary education on a voucher basis. The high income elasticity of demand for education and health care, as demonstrated in
a number of recent studies,  for example,  Squire (1993), suggests that eliminating the constraints that prevent  investment in
human capital and providing economic opportunities to use this human capital, may be associated with high payoffs in terms of
a more equitable distribution of wealth.
22off with such policies, such as small agricultural producers, rural workers, or consumers,
often been unsuccessful  in changing them? To answer these questions, we must consider
the issues related to political decisionmaking  and institution formation, depicted in the left-
hand side of Figure 1.
5. Political  decisionmaking
We  first  consider whether  differences in  political  regimes  and  decisionmaking
processes can explain variations in policy outcomes (equation 4),  independently of  how
such differences come about.  Under ideal conditions a variety of political decision making-
processes can lead to efficiency- and growth-enhancing  policy mixes.  The fact that many
countries have not experienced  sustained  growth suggests that these ideal conditions have
rarely been satisfied.  It is thus necessary to  identify the  critical deviations from  ideal
conditions,  the reasons for such deviations,  and their likely impact on policy outcomes.
5.1  Political regimes and decisionmaking  processes
Models of  political decisionmaking processes have  been based on  three main
assumptions: a  social planner maximizes a  social welfare function, an autocratic ruler
maximizes dynastic wealth, or democratic decisionmaking processes make the  median
voter decisive.  Under ideal conditions all of these systems can be consistent with the
maximization  of efficiency and growth (Lal 1993; Olson 1990, Squire 1993).
The three decision rules can also be viewed as special cases of  interest-group
equilibria, in which where interest groups use resources to  influence policy outcomes.
Competitive  lobbying by interest groups can, under certain conditions, lead to the adoption
of policies that raise output and efficiency.  This is because such policies produce gains
rather than deadweight costs, so that the groups which benefit have an intrinsic advantage
over those harmed (Becker 1983, 1985).
The first condition holds that politicians act as impartial arbitrators rather than self-
interested players. The state is stable. Interest groups are predetermined  and equally able
to  use "pressure production technologies" that transform resources (such as labor and
capital) into political influence.
23Second, the costs of  "influence production"  (including the deadweight losses
associated  with redistributing  resources)  are assumed  to be convex in the amount of
resources  redistributed.2a  Also, all participants  have perfect information,  thus being fully
aware  of the increasingly  distortionary  effects  of additional  redistribution.
Third, an aggregate  budget constraint  allows decisionmakers  to increase  public
expenditures  only  by imposing  additional  (explicit  or implicit)  taxes  on citizens. The intuition
behind  this third condition  is straightforward:  if all groups have full knowledge  of policy
impacts  and are equally  capable  of influencing  policies,  none will agree  to policies  that
increases  another's  utility without  also increasing  its own.  They will agree only to the
provision  of public  goods that increase  aggregate  welfare (for example,  infrastructure  or
agricultural  research).
Although these ideal conditions  rarely hold, considering  them can still provide
important  information  on what  might  happen  if certain  conditions  are not met. For  example,
pressure  groups  with poor  pressure  production  technologies,  or few resources  to employ
their technologies  would clearly  be heavily  taxed.  If acquiring  information  is costly and
groups  can spread misinformation  or appeal  to ideologies  in order to conceal the true
effects  of policies,  this could  lead to the implementation  of policies  that benefit  politically
powerful  groups  while reducing  social output. The presence  of self-interested  politicians
whose survival in office may depend  on the short-term  benefits  they provide  to vocal
constituencies  adds  further  complications.  Thus investigating  the consequences  of political
processes  under ideal conditions  is unlikely  to be useful in explaining  the variations  in
agricultural  policy  regimes  discussed  in section  1.1. Instead  we focus  on the differences  in
political  environments  within  which  pressure  groups  form  and interact. First,  we look at the
factors  which effect interest  groups'  abilities  to organize  politically  and use informational
advantages  (equation  3). We then  turn to the political  environment  and its implications  for
policy  outcomes  (equation  4).
20  Convexity implies that deadweight losses increase more than proportionately with the amount transferred and that
the most efficient method of redistribution,  that  is, the one generating the least amount of  resistance,  will be chosen.  In a
number of important cases this assumption does not hold, although-in  the absence of coercion or discrimination-the  cost of
redistribution is generally convex.
245.2 Interest  group formation
If interest  groups  cannot  be taken  as exogenously  given,  we need  to pay attention  to
the factors  that foster  their  formation  (as  indicated  in the lower  left hand  quarter  of Figure  1).
Interest groups provide members with goods and  services that  have  public-good
characteristics,  including information,  marketing  and other services, and lobbying for
policies  or programs  favorable  to its members. However,  the provision  of public goods  is
associated  with a free-rider  problem:  individuals  may  enjoy  benefits  that they  do not  pay for.
Three  main  factors  help  facilitate  collective  action:  ease  of communication  and  enforcement,
clear property  rights  to economically  valuable  resources,  and members'  high educational
and  informational  status.
Collective  action becomes  easier if group sizes are small, benefits  concentrated,
communication  easy,  and  enforcement  of sanctions  possible  at low  cost (Olson  1971). The
potential  for collective  action  can be enhanced  if, in addition  to the public good, clubs-
which can range from neighborhood  associations  to political parties-can  provide an
excludable  by-product  (for example,  legal or tax advisory  services,  or towing  for cars) to
members  and  tie delivery  to member  contributions.  Collective  action  can also be easier  for
groups  formed  on the basis of identifiable  characteristics  or social  ties, which can create
barriers  to entry  and  enforce  rules  at low  cost.
Owning  economically  valuable resources  can further effective collective  action.
Clearly,  wealth  increases  the owner's  ability  to spend  resources  to attain  political  ends. But
wealth also affects attitudes  toward risk taking.  If absolute  risk aversion  declines  with
wealth,  the poor  will be more  risk-averse  than  the rich. Even  if they enjoy  equal  potential  for
collective  action and equal pressure production  technologies,  they will invest less in
lobbying  for any given  reward. The poor  will thus be taxed  at higher  rates than wealthier
agents if tax rates are determined  by democratic  bargaining  between  income groups
(Aumann  and Kurz  1977).
The risk  aversion  effect  on taxation  will be stronger  if the poor  have  higher  discount
rates because  of imperfect  financial  and insurance  markets,  and inferior  risk-diversification
options,  for example,  if they lack  nonagricultural  sources  of income  or do not have  a strong
25social network.  That discount rates vary with wealth and income has been confirmed
experimentally  for landless  workers and farmers in South India (Pender 1992).
The educational and informational status of different interest groups affects their
ability to evaluate the impact of any given policy or program on their welfare.  With low
levels of  education, it  is  difficult to  detect misinformation (in  the  form  of  ideology or
"obfuscation") that  may be spread by other interest groups.  High levels of education,
informational advantages, and the ability to appeal to popular ideologies, by contrast, can
greatly enhance a group's ability to appropriate  resources  for itself.
Clearly observable  and distinguishable  group characteristics, in addition to furthering
collective  action, can facilitate discrimination-using  characteristics  such as cultural identity,
class, gender, race, or skin-color as proxies for economically relevant traits such as skills.
Historically,  discrimination  has been used to create and maintain privileges for certain races
and cultures,  and to hide the real economic  costs of existing privileges.21
The continuing importance  of discrimination  is confirmed by studies that demonstrate
the existence of systematic wage differentials  that are not related to relevant performance-
characteristics,  such as schooling or individual ability.  Psacharopoulos  and Patrinos  (1995),
for example,  document such differentials  for Brazilians of African origin (who make up much
of the poor rural population  of the northeast)  and for Indian groups in several Latin American
countries (which are over-represented in poor peasant populations).  Observable wage
differentials may, of course, be compounded by the fact that certain groups are denied
equal access to economic  opportunities,  such as education, markets, or credit, a factor that
could-through  unequal access to education and its returns-lead  to persistence of such
differences  across generations. Rural panel data from South India, for example, show that
higher caste status and male gender are associated  with better access to education, even
21  Roback (1990) illustrates that in many cases racial differences that  had fallen  into oblivion were  resurrected to
legitimize privileges that had no objective justification.  Akerlof (1985) shows that sorting on the basis of group characteristics
can  be  dynamically  stable,  even  if  the  key  characteristics  are  completely  unrelated  to  individuals'  relevant
performanceattributes.
26after correcting  for schooling  of, and inheritance  from parents  (Binswanger  and Singh
1  994).22
Finally,  since  forming  interest  groups  involves  costs,  the evolution  of the social  and
institutional  environment  should  involve  accumulation  processes  similar  to those  discussed
above  for physical  capital.  Theories  of social  capital  formation  explore  characteristics  of the
social  and institutional  environment  formally  (Durlauf  1992). They demonstrate  that initial
differences  in  the  quantity  or quality  of social  capital,  such  as trust,  affect  the ability  of group
members  to accumulate  factors  of production  and can lead  to stratification  that is socially
inefficient  and very difficult to reverse (Benabou  1994).  Conversely,  destroying  social
capital and traditional  institutions,  by, for example, forcibly eliminating  communal  land
tenure  as occurred  in much  of Central  America  in the 1870s,  may have  long-term  impacts
far beyond  eliminating  the  risk  diversification  and  safety-net  functions  discussed  earlier.
The importance  of these  factors  in interest  group  formation  has been  confirmed  by a
number  of studies  (Bates  1983;  Magee,  Brock,  and Young  1989  Swinnen  and van der Zee
1994). Gardner  (1987)  has quantified  and evaluated  these  factors  for the United  States  in
an econometric  framework,  in order to explore  the interaction  between  collective  action,
material  conditions,  and the general  characteristics  of the economic  environment.  Spatial
concentration  of production  of a specific  commodity  and lower  variability  of production  (both
of which reduce  the cost of communication  and organization)  lead to greater  protection.
Higher  output  per  producer,  which  would  make  it easier  to form  a pressure  group  with  fewer
members,  does  the same. A high rate  of output  growth,  everything  else constant,  makes  it
more  profitable  to invest resources  in productive  rather  than redistributive  activities,  and in
less  distortionary  policies  (observations  show  that distortionary  policies  are less  likely  to be
applied to fast-growing  commodities). Regional  shifts of production  create divergent
interests  between  "old"  and "new"  producers,  and therefore  reduce  their ability  to lobby  for
transfers.  Finally, commodities  that face import competition  receive more protection
22 In most cases wage equations have been estimated using cross-sectional rather than panel data, and do not therefore
correct for  unobservable individual attributes.  The South Indian panel data enabled accounting for  both unobservable fixed
household effects, as  well as  correction  for  parental endowment effects,  and therefore  represent  stronger  evidence for the
persistence of discrimination.
27because  import  tariffs  or quotas  do not require  budgetary  outlays  or taxation  of producers;
instead,  a large  number  of consumers  bear  the  costs.
The framework  of collective  action described  above helps identify  and define  the
groups that would likely form and act collectively  to influence  agricultural  and agrarian
policies.  The  groups  fall into three  broad  categories:  agricultural  producers,  rural  elites,  and
urban  dwellers.
Agricultural  producers are separated  by  large physical distances,  which
makes  communication  difficult,  unless  infrastructure-such  as roads  or telecommunications
systems-is well developed. Furthermore,  since agricultural  activities  are seasonal,  the
potential  for concentrated  collective  action  is limited  to the slow  seasons.  These  limitations
are most pronounced  for peasants  and other small producers  who are widely  dispersed,
produce  a variety  of heterogeneous  goods for home consumption  and the market, are
lacking  education  and access to infrastructure,  and lack strong social ties.  Poor rural
women  are less mobile  than men,  which is important  when  their interests  do not coincide
with  those  of men, as in the allocation  of land  rights. To the degree  that small  farmers  are
racially  or culturally  distinct  from  dominant  groups,  discrimination  would  likely  further  reduce
their potential  for collective  action and make them more susceptible  to taxation, as
illustrated  by a wide range  of historical  evidence. The differences  in income  and wealth
generated  by discrimination  and differential  accumulation  of social  capital  in turn reduce  the
political  action  potential  of the groups  suffering  from  discrimination.
*  Rural elites are able to overcome  the disadvantages  of spatial dispersion
because they  are  smaller in  number; have greater wealth and  education, market
participation,  and social integration;  and have greater  access  to modern  communications
technology. Their knowledge  of agricultural  conditions  also gives them an informational
advantage relative to  urban groups.  If  they  produce a  specific (geographically
concentrated)  commodity,  they may be able  to supply  and withdraw  favors. This enables
them to form  clubs  that are potentially  valuable  partners  for urban  interest  groups,  even if
the  two  groups  often  have  different  economic  interests.
28*  Urban  dwellers  benefit  from  spatial  concentration,  the relative  unimportance
of weather  risks,  and  freedom  from  seasonal  work  cycles. Formal  urban  workers,  especially
those who work for large firms or for agencies  that deliver  public services,  can use the
organizational  structures  of their  firms  for collective  action.  They also  enjoy  steady  incomes
that make  them less  vulnerable  to risk. They have  a strong  economic  interest  in low food
prices  and are able  to organize  highly  visible  manifestations  of discontent,  such  as strikes.
Informal  urban  workers,  by contrast,  generally  have  few assets,  little education,  and small
and unreliable  incomes. Yet because  they are concentrated  spatially,  it is still easier  for
them  to mobilize  than  it is for peasants.  Urban  commercial  and  industrial  elites  enjoy  all  the
advantages  of the rural elites, but without  the disadvantages  of spatial dispersion  and
covariance  of risk. Bureaucratic  elites  share  these  advantages  and may also benefit  from
social  ties arising  from common  class origins  and educational  experiences. Sometimes
they are  formally organized into administrative  corps, further lowering their cost of
organization.  In addition,  they  have  privileged  access  to information  and  to the enforcement
mechanisms  of the state.
5.3 Choice  of policy  instruments
The framework  under  which  lobbying  can be "socially  efficient,"  outlined  by Becker
(1983, 1985), can also help explain the types of instruments  chosen to  redistribute
resources  in the political  arena. First, it is often much easier  to transfer  resources  in the
political  arena  when the transfer  does not involve  a visible exchange  of money. Thus,
politically,  it is easier  to transfer  resources  through  distortionary  trade,  pricing,  or tax  policies
than through  policies  involving  less  distortionary  direct payments.  That is why it has been
so difficult  to decouple  income  support  to farmers  and production  decisions  in industrialized
economies,  even  though  direct  income  support  would  enhance  overall  welfare.23
Second,  politically  motivated  transfers  of resources  are more  acceptable  if they can
be administered  within  existing  institutional  mechanisms,  rather  than by creating  new ones.
23 A shift to overt support for  farmers through transfer  payments that are financed from the regular budget,  rather
than through price policies financed by all consumers,  may be resisted because it would be less regressive,  falling more on
higher-income earners who are more vocal politically.
29The  potential to  use existing  organizational structures or  organizational residues  to
redistribute resources is particularly great in the agricultural sector.  Numerous institutions
of supply management and price stabilization (marketing boards or buffer stocks) that had
been established during times of  war or  commodity price collapses, with  the goal  of
ensuring food security or supporting producer prices, have subsequently been converted
into agencies whose primary purpose shifted increasingly toward transferring resources to
powerful  lobbies (Krueger 1992).
Third,  appealina  to  popular  ideologies  enhances  the  political  feasibility  of
redistributive measures. 24 For example, in many countries redistributive measures have
been  justified to attain food security, agricultural  modernization,  environmental  protection, or
economies of  scale in agricultural production.  Yet  innumerable studies show that few
policies meant to  promote food  security actually benefit  poor  or  hungry  households.
Conversely,  the use of ideologies enabled socialist governments  to establish state farms or
collectives, and enabled many capitalist governments to  direct scarce resources toward
supporting  large  haciendas, despite  considerable theoretical  and  empirical  evidence
demonstrating  the efficiency advantage  of family farms.25
6.  THE INSTITUTIONAL  AND POLITICAL  ENVIRONMENT
In this section we discuss how the insights from the previous sections can help us to
understand the evolution of the institutional and political environment, (equation 3) and its
impact on political outcomes (equation 4).  We discuss institutional economics and the
historical  literature before shifting the discussion to recent class-based  approaches.
24  It is not clear to what extent ideas and ideologies are used to bring about political and policy changes, rather than
to merely legitimize policies that would have been adopted anyway because of interest group pressure.  Nor is it clear to what
extent ideas and ideologies facilitate the spread of specific policy mixes across countries. The literature on agricultural policies
and agrarian relations does not address these issues.  Further research is needed.
25  The substantial empirical evidence assembled by Chayanov. shows that the high productive capacity of  peasant
agriculture had no impact on the policy of collectivization of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s, but was instead suppressed
(Thorner, Kerblay, and Smith 1966).  Similarly, the considerable evidence indicating the negative association between farm size
and productivity generated during the 1960s and early 1970s (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995) had no influence on the
agrarian strategies that were adopted in many Latin American and or southern African countries.
306.1  Institutional  economics
Institutional  economics  is concerned  with why institutions  vary so much across space
and why they change over time.  Institutional  economics  sees the state as a rational device
created to  reduce the transaction costs that arose once economic relations became too
complex to be handled within personalized networks of exchange (North  1989, 1990).n
Transaction costs include costs of measuring  the attributes of goods or services, specifying
the  nature  of  exchange between  parties (the  contracting technology), and  enforcing
contracts.  The  state  reduces transaction costs  by  providing public goods,  such  as
impersonal  rules of exchange and institutions  that enforce laws.
North points out that under certain material, political, and economic conditions,  which
form transaction cost constraints, states are not established, even though this would be
economically beneficial.  Instead inefficient institutions are adopted.  These conditions
include barriers to collective action within a given social organization, high fixed costs and
risks of establishing  or transforming  institutions, and networks that provide disincentives for
individuals  or groups to adopt new rules of the game unless most others do the same, and
(d) preferences  that are based on ideologies.
Competitive  constraints,  which arise when economically  powerful groups from inside
or outside the state are able to contest and challenge the ruler's legitimacy and monopoly
on power, may also lead to the establishment  of suboptimal institutions.27  While competitive
constraints  may limit the potential  for rulers to arbitrarily  exploit their subjects, they may also
give rise to anarchy and chaos, a weak state characterized by stagnation and poverty, and
the dissipation  of resources  rather than investment.
26 In economies characterized by personalized exchange relationships, trust-based "contractual technologies" rely on a
dense communication network,  common ideologies, and a set of rules to which all adhere.  The personalized  networks are
sufficient to maintain the optimal  level of economic activity.  However,  with  increased volumes of  exchange,  personalized
networks become less efficient means for economic activity and trade.
27 The concept of competitive constraints is closely related to that of contestable monopoly (Baumol, et al. 1982).
31In North's framework  institutional  change  is closely related  to changes  in relative
prices  or in ideologies  that  alter  the  political  bargaining  power  of different  groups. 2s Changes
in real  prices  occur  because  of exogenous  changes  in material  conditions,  such  as changes
in population  density,  productive  or military  technology,  or trade. The relative bargaining
power  of different  groups  shifts  with exogenous  changes  by enabling  groups  to win higher
payoffs through recontracting,  or  by  challenging  the  fairness of  existing contractual
arrangements.  Thus changes  in prices and material  conditions  directly affect  political
outcomes.
The historical  material  discussed  in the next section  explores  these ideas  in much
greater  depth,  and examines  the role of material  conditions,  and the impact  of changes  in
material  conditions  on the  political  power  of interest  groups  and class  alliances.
6.2 State  formation
A well-functioning  and stable  state  in which  all interest  groups  are represented  and
can interact  freely must exist before  efficiency-enhancing  policies  can emerge.  How  do
such  states  arise? What influences  their  characteristics  (lower  left hand  quadrant  in Figure
1)?  In this section, we explore how material  conditions  strongly influence  state and
institutional  characteristics. To understand  the political economy of rural areas it  is
essential  to go beyond  agriculture.
Like other  institutions,  states  are formed  because  they are useful  to specific  groups
of economic  agents. To focus on the relationship  between  material  conditions  and the
nature  of states,  it is useful  to adopt  a broad  comparative  perspective,  as in Tilly (1990).
Tilly  defines  states  as organizations  that control  the principal means  of coercion  and armed
forces in a population  that enables  them to attack external  and internal  rivals in order  to
promote  the states' (or the ruling groups') interests,  requisition  needed resources  from
2S  Ideology is defined as the  willingness of  individuals to pay for  their  convictions.  The  relation to the  relevant
economic variables, that is, the ability to pay, is not drawn.  This definition ignores the fact that ideological convictions matter
little as  long as they are not accompanied by the (economic) power to enforce them.  Even the abolition of slavery,  often
attributed to a shift in ideology, occurred only when the power to enforce the new law became available.
32subjects,  and ensure a minimum  acceptable  supply of food, means  of production,  and
economic  well-being  for  the people.
In this framework  an issue of critical importance  is whether states acquire the
resources  necessary  to function  through  extractive  or through  representative  institutions.
Extractive  institutions  rely on coercion,  yield relatively  little revenue,  and, most  importantly,
do not  encourage  private  investment-and thus do not instigate  a virtuous  cycle  of growth
and increased provision of  public goods.  Such virtuous cycles arise only where
representative  institutions,  such  as parliaments  and  courts  that limit  the power  of leaders  to
arbitrarily  change rules or expropriate  resources,  have been established. Then, strong
institutions,  such as  secure property rights and  impartial enforcement  of  contracts,
encourage  investment  by private  individuals  and  facilitate  sustainable  growth.29
What are the conditions  that facilitate  the formation  of representative  rather than
extractive  institutions?  One  recurring  theme  in the historical  literature  is that representative
institutions  were  more  likely  to arise  when  a reasonably  well-defined  and stable  government
was faced  with  fiscal crisis. To meet  the associated  resource  requirements,  ruling  groups
often had  little choice but to  agree, through bargaining,  to  the  establishment  of
representative  institutions in exchange for resources (Tilly 1990).3o  Throughout history, this
has  been  the  main  reason  representative  institutions  were  created. A second  issue  of great
historical  relevance  is that, once established,  institutions,  ideologies,  or organizational
structures  often  acquired  a life  of their  own  and  remained  in place  even  after  the  groups  that
had created  them or the material  conditions  that led to their formation  had disappeared  or
29 Historically,  representative institutions became important as changes in technology made war increasingly capital-
intensive which necessitated the establishment of costly standing armies.  Even in centralized states, such as France or Prussia,
which had managed to limit the power of representative institutions for several  centuries,  representative institutions acquired
more power  with respect to the crown as regular taxation, credit,  and payment of the national debt became essential for the
maintenance of the armed forces.
30 A formal description of such bargaining and the set of possible solutions is presented in Hong (1987) and Skaperdas
(1992).
33changed.  Such organizational  residues continued  to  affect economic behavior and
allocation  of public  resources. 31
While  bargaining  between  interest  groups  is the decisive  mode  of interaction  when  a
state exists, material  conditions  and factor endowments  determine  the range of feasible
production  and military technologies,  thus limiting  the degree of specialization  that is
possible  and the nature of the state that can emerge.  Three main categories  can be
distinguished:  domestic,  capital-intensive,  and coercion-intensive  societies.
*  Domestic societies.  These  are based  on villages  and social  structures  that
operate  without or on the margins of  states and are characterized  by  smooth and
uninterrupted,  but slow transitions  to more productive  forms of agriculture  and secure
individual  property rights in  land (Boserup 1965).  Societies undergoing  this sort of
transformation  were limited  to isolated  areas  with low agricultural  or mining  potential,  and
relatively  low  population  densities. Examples  include  Argentina  until  the nineteenth  century,
Colombia,  Iceland,  and Papua  New  Guinea-regions that were relatively  isolated,  with too
few resources  to interest  foreign  powers-and Jos Plateau  in Nigeria  or the central  cantons
of Switzerland,  territories  that were easy to defend.  In all these regions  low population
densities,  a lack  of goods  for export,  and consequently  little economic  specialization  led to
the creation  of very small political  entities  with little formal  administrative  structures  and
relatively  egalitarian  societies  that remained  largely  outside broader  economic  or political
systems.32
31  An important type of such residues are institutions that had been established to cope with fiscal or food supply
crises  during  times of  war.  Instead of  being dissolved after  the war,  they acquired new functions.  In  the industrial and
developing world the origins of a number of  state institutions for  managing food supplies can  be traced  back to the great
depression  and World War  II.  In  developing countries marketing  boards and state-owned marketing  organizations  for key
commodities such as sugar, and a large number of food parastatals fall in the same category.  The changing purpose of such
institutions-from  price stabilization, to financing of the war effort,  and finally the continued taxation of small producers-is
well-documented (for example, Helleiner 1966, Krueger  1992).
32  There are two main types of domestic societies.  Meillassoux (1981) shows that where climatic risk is low, such as
in  the  subhumid  and  humid  tropics,  societies  are  relatively  unstratified,  composed  of  loosely  connected  family-clans.
However,  where covariate environmental risks are high, societies have hierarchical  social structures dominated by elders.  In
arid and semi-arid environments the survival of households depends on grain storage, a task best entrusted to elders,  who have
experience evaluating the risks and consequences of failing to manage stores carefully and who possess the social status to
enforce decisions.  Binswanger and McIntire (1987) have further extended this analysis.
34*  Coercive  societies.  Coercive societies are characterized by low economic
specialization, low investment, and  highly coercive political structures, led by either  an
external power or  domestic ruling class or  nobility.  Coercive societies arose  where
population densities were  low,  land  was  abundant, and  populations were  spatially
dispersed-and  where  a  state was  able to  impose itself on  local populations.  Their
formation can be explained  as follows (Tilly 1990).
First, since  specialization was  limited and  land was abundant, collecting taxes
required coercion.  Thus much tax revenue was dissipated on military action rather than
spent on public  goods or invested in productive  enterprises.
Second, the spatial dispersion of the population  meant that a central ruler had to rely
on  intermediaries to  collect taxes.  The tax  collectors maintained independent armies,
acquired considerable power, established sizable fiefdoms. and often amassed substantial
wealth-at  the  expense of  the  central ruler who  was  reduced to  heading of  a  loose
federation.  A central ruler had to strengthen his position by increasing competition for or
monopolizing  access to the elite, or through central enforcement  of a legal code-an  option
that was available only where loyal enforcing institutions, such as a bureaucratic corps or
the military, existed.33
Third, in areas with low population  densities that produced goods primarily for export
(minerals or agricultural outputs) rather than for domestic consumption, it was often very
difficult to recruit laborers. Since land was abundant,  the native population  had little reason
to work in the mines or the large farms unless they could earn more than they could on their
own farms.  Four solutions were used to solve the problem of labor shortages: attractive
incentives  were offered for immigration  (Prussia, United States); slaves were imported on a
large scale (Brazil,  the Caribbean);  indentured  laborers  were brought in from labor-abundant
countries such as India, China, and Ireland (United States, the Caribbean, Fiji); or  the
33 In Russia the central ruler strengthened his position by enforcing legislation to stop individual landlords from raiding
each other's labor forces.  He endorsed laws requiring the return of escaped laborers to the original owners, actions that would not
normally be taken by the producers.  Given the prevailing labor shortage, it would have been more profitable for them to employ
the escaped workers themselves.
35reservation utilities of independent peasant producers were reduced through taxation and
discriminatory  interventions  in factor and product markets (Kenya, South  Africa, Peru).
While the first  action was not directly coercive, the  other three-which  involved
measures such as taxation, limitations on economic opportunities, restrictions on spatial or
occupational mobility,  or  overt  discrimination-depended  on  strong  coercive  power.
Regardless  of their form and primary purpose, the economically  most important and lasting
effect of these measures was their impact on the  ability and incentives to  accumulate
physical and human capital. They severely reduced efficiency and productivity growth, and
in many cases left institutional legacies and organizational residues that  outlasted the
groups that had created them or the material conditions (such as low population density)
that originally  led to their introduction.  34
For example, it has been argued that the Indian caste system originated to reduce
the potential for peasants to establish their own farms on unsettled land where land was
abundant.  The discriminatory institutional structure that developed remained even after
population  densities had increased,  raising the scarcity value of land and making it possible
to  collect land  taxes without  coercion.  The  caste system, along with  the  continued
extraction of  a  large proportion of  farm output from  the  peasantry, resulted in severe
agricultural  stagnation: yields in most of Indian agriculture in 1970 were little different from
those of 2000 years earlier (Lal 1988).
There are many examples  of coercive institutions  which arose in colonies where land
was abundant,  for example in Nigeria in the nineteenth century or Brazil, Prussia, Russia,
and South Africa much earlier.  To maintain control over widely dispersed populations,
central rulers "co-opted landlords and clergy, subordinated the peasantry, built extensive
bureaucracies,  and stifled their bourgeoisie" (Tilly 1990).  Not surprisingly, these colonies
34 Community institutions often remained the foci of popular life and potential bases for resistance against the power
elite, as long as there were no alternative representative institutions through which the elite could be held accountable.  In both
England and France  the importance of community institutions declined once households were  able to appeal  to independent
national courts to define and enforce their property rights,  suggesting that the development of accountable and predictable rules
governing  the exercise  of  elite  power  are  necessary,  though  not  always  sufficient  conditions  for  the  transformation  of
community-based institutions (Magagna 1991).
36were characterized  by low levels  of private  investment,  relatively  high levels of resource
dissipated  in internal  power  struggles,  and  a large  role  for the  state  and  the military.
0  Capital-intensive  societies. These  societies  are characterized  by high levels
of private  investment  and the existence  of representative  institutions,  which  often emerged
through lengthy bargaining  between  groups of comparatively  equal power.  Examples
include  city-states,  such as Venice or the Low Countries,  which initially  prospered  from
cheap  transport  by sea and  relatively  high  population  densities  (Tilly  1990). These  societies
obtained  the bulk of their revenues  from taxes on trade and achieved  a relatively  high
degree  of independence  from  agriculture  and  landlord  interests. Furthermore,  the relatively
low cost of communication,  the organization  of subjects  into trading  organizations  (guilds),
and  international  competition  between  different  trading  centers  made  it difficult  for the rulers
to extract taxes and made investment  in public goods more desirable.  Establishing
representative  institutions  was by no means  a smooth  process,  generally  involving  lengthy
bargaining  between  rulers  and subjects.  3  As the state  became  increasingly  dependent  on
revenues  from individual  entrepreneurs  making decentralized  investment  decisions in
increasingly  integrated  financial  markets,  it became  perilous  for rulers  to adopt obviously
growth-reducing  policies.
The  bargaining  power  of subjects  and the  establishment  of representative  institutions
advanced  greatly  where  a state's  financial  crisis  required  an immediate  solution.  The  much-
quoted  case  of the United  Kingdom  shows  how this  occurred  (North  1989;  Tilly 1990). For
centuries  neither  the king, the merchant  elite, nor the landlords  were able to establish  a
clear supremacy  of power. Through  the concentration  of commercial  activity  in a single
location, London, the  commercial  elite established  a  strong power base.  Because
population  was low-density  and high  dispersed  throughout  the rest of the country,  the king
depended  on powerful  intermediaries  to collect  taxes  and maintain  law and order. Given
35  For  example,  in Genoa most of  the population was initially excluded from  the benefits of  trade and economic
development, leading to political instability, civil wars, and low growth.  Exogenous shocks in the form  of repeated foreign
aggression  triggered  policy  reforms that  established a representative  form  of  government  and,  through  the  separation of
legislative and executive power, brought about greater security of property rights.  This change led to a spurt of technological
and organizational innovations, and rapid increases in trade volume that soon made the city a major economic power (Greif
1994).
37these conditions,  fiscal crises that brought the monarchy  close to bankruptcy forced the king
to concede political and legal rights to the landlords and merchant elites in return for their
support, leading to the establishment of independent institutions.36  Once a parliament had
been established that represented  the political views of the three interest groups, the king
lost  his power to  control redistribution, and  thus  his  power to  adopt growth-reducing
extractive policies.  Still, while the bargaining between politically vocal groups prevented
adoption of the most obviously efficiency-reducing  forms of taxation, the new system did
have a negative impact on nonelites. The peasantry  lacked political representation,  paid the
bulk of the taxes, and lost most of their land rights in the process.
The more recent literature on policy reform  supports the general view that reform
attempts are most likely to be initiated and succeed when the state is facing  fiscal crisis,
and that efficiency-enhancing  policies will be sustained only when groups that benefit from
the policies defend them against pressure from groups that benefit from the alternatives.
Becker's model, emphasizing the importance of equal access to "lobbying technology" by
contenders as a precondition for constrained-efficient  outcomes, is the counterpart of this
set of historical  findings.
6.3  Class-relations
Some of the most complete and insightful descriptions of the patterns found above
are discussed in a large literature inspired by historical materialism. Within this framework
of  analysis, self-interested classes-defined  as  groups of  individuals who,  given their
ownership of productive factors such as land, labor, and capital, behave in economically
similar ways-are  the main political and economic actors.  The material determinants that
govern relations  of production,  surplus appropriation,  and the interests  and power of classes
are described in detail, and the state is viewed as an instrument that serves the economic
interests  of the dominant classes or ruling elites.  Political decisionmaking  mechanisms are
36  In Spain, by contrast, where the colonies  offered the possibility  of almost unlimited  resource  extraction  through
repression and physical force, there was no pressure to prevent the emergence of an  extremely wasteful apparatus of
unproductive  bureaucrats,  which eventually  reduced  economic  growth directly  and indirectly.
38used  or altered  by the dominant  classes  to further  their  economic  interests. Ideology  is not
an independent  factor  but  a policy  tool.37
The most elaborate  and original application  of a Marxist framework  to explain
relations  of production  in agriculture  at the periphery  of the industrial  world has been
provided  by de Janvry  (1981). He shows how in Latin  America  class alliances  led to the
establishment  of  dualistic structures characterized  by  a  concentration  of  industrial
production  on luxury  goods  and dependence  on imports  for other goods,  such as capital
and basic  consumption  goods. In this situation  of economic  disarticulation  "development"
was equated with minimizing  labor costs, leading to regressive  and repressive labor
policies,  and proletarization  of labor.
De Janvry (1981) shows how these patterns of development  led to stagnation,
impoverishment,  and destruction  of peasant  and artisan  spheres. These  outcomes  came
about  through  several  channels:  the  import-substitution  strategy  for growth  depended  on the
import of capital goods and technical knowledge,  which drained resources  from the
domestic  economy;  savings  rates  were  low  and  the market  limited,  so capital  for investment
had to come  from heavily  taxed peasant  and artisan  sectors;  to keep  wages  in the export
sector  low,  food  prices  were  kept  low  at the expense  of small  domestic  producers;  and large
farmers  often received  credit subsidies  and other  special  benefits  intended  to bring  about
rapid  technical  change  and  mechanization  in the  "modern"  agricultural  sector.
Thus a functional  dualism  emerged  between  the large-scale  farms and the small
plots cultivated  by farm workers or small landowners. These workers earned below-
subsistence  wages  on the large  farms  and  fulfilled  their  subsistence  needs  with  output  from
their  tiny farms. The  two  farm  sectors  were  mutually  dependent  in a single  dualistic  system.
With  population growth and  mechanization  (often subsidized), labor supply
outstripped  labor demand,  and peasant  households  tended  to disintegrate. Workers  and
37  Most Marxist theories assume a marked dichotomy between feudal and capitalist economies.  In feudal economies
surplus is expropriated through direct coercion or control over labor, possibly backed up by distortionary policies.  In capitalist
economies, by contrast,  surplus can be expropriated  even under perfectly  competitive markets  with voluntary  transactions.
Roemer (1982) shows this to be a consequence of wealth inequality and credit constraints.
39peasant  families  migrated  to cities in search  of work, where  a protected  modern  sector
generating  large profits  and high  wages  for a few coexisted  with  a growing  informal  sector
characterized  by low  wages. Thus  functional  dualism  was recreated  in urban  areas.
According  to this  view  the  main  factor  influencing  the pattern  of development  prevails
is whether  or not the bourgeoisie  is aligned  with or against  the working  class. Where  the
bourgeoisie  was  weak, it joined forces  with  foreign  capitalists  and the landed  elite against
workers,  resulting  in dualistic  patterns  of development.  By  contrast,  where  the bourgeoisie
was strong,  it aligned  workers  and peasants  against  the landed  elite, leading  to articulated
development.38
Therefore, to de Janvry, increasing  the political participation  by  the poor, by
enhancing  their potential  for collective  action,  is key to bringing  about increased  efficiency
and sustained  and  equitable  growth. In the long  run the  only feasible  way  to achieve  this  is
to increase  the productive  capacity  of the rural  population. De Janvry  strongly  advocates
that governments  increase  their spending  on schools  and health  care  facilities  for the rural
poor.  to improve  their  ability  to participate  in the political  process. But  the adoption  of such
"social  pact"  policies  is itself a political  decision. Few  social  pacts have  survived  in Latin
America  for prolonged  periods  of time.
The Marxist  analyses  discussed  above  aim to explain  the entire  circle  of economic
and political  interactions  presented  in Figure  1. Yet they  often fail to recognize  sufficiently
that in predominantly  capitalist  systems  there are a wide range  of growth-reducing  policies
that  will, in the  long  run,  not  benefit  any  of the interest  groups  involved  in policymaking.  The
resource  dissipation  and economic  stagnation  so prevalent  in many  developing  countries  is
attributed  largely  to the peripheral  role of these economies  in the international  division  of
labor. Little  attention  is paid  to the  wide range  of growth-reducing  policies  that would not  in
the long-run  benefit  any of the interest  groups  involved  in policy-making.  This tends to
divert attention away from analyzing  the impact of the distortions  and from pursuing
alternative  explanations  of their origin.  What needs to be better understood  are the
3  Note the similarity to the discussion of the capital intensive path to state formation by Tilly (1990).
40conditions  under which rational pursuit of economic self-interest  can lead to  political
outcomes  that  are detrimental  to growth.
Rueschemeyer,  Stephens,  and Stephens  (1992),  building  on earlier  work by Moore
(1966),  further  explain  the role of political  coalitions  in affecting  policy  outcomes. General
policy  outcomes  are the result  of a contest  between  (repressive)  landlords,  whose  wealth
resulted  from access  to cheap labor and sometimes  protection  from foreign competition,
and a bourgeoisie  whose  interests  were  more closely  aligned  with broad-based  economic
growth  and  democratic  development.  Rueschemeyer  Stephens,  and  Stephens  observe  that
at early  stages  of development  all over  the  world, large  landlords  derived  their  wealth  from
cheap  labor,  the availability  of which  was assured  by coercive  legislation  or discriminatory
taxation  of free peasants. By contrast,  the bourgeoisie  were in an ambivalent  position,
supporting  landlords  where  they had  originated  in a landlord-based  nobility,  but aligning  with
workers  where  they had  not. Societies  in which  the bourgeoisie  aligned  with  landlords  were
often characterized  by low product  diversification,  concentration  on heavy industry,  and
protection  from foreign competition  (upon which the nobility depended  for its economic
welfare). Their transition  to democracy  was often hindered  by autocratic  and dictatorial
episodes.  By contrast, societies  in which landlords  were never powerful  (because  of
material conditions)  were characterized  by  a  relatively high degree of mobility, high
specialization,  economic  growth,  openness,  and  a smooth  transition  to democracy.
In this context an authoritarian  coalition comprising  the state, labor-repressive
landlords,  and a dependent  bourgeoisie  was most likely to arise  where  economic  activity
was  concentrated  in agriculture  and  a large  number  of the high-level  bureaucrats  came  from
the landed  class; landowners  were economically  more important  than the industry-based
bourgeoisie  (either  because  there  were  few industries  or because  landlords  owned  most  of
them);  the bourgeoisie  was dependent  on the state,  which  provided  industrial  protection  or
cheap  credit  and infrastructure;  and  the peasantry  had little  or no ability  for politically  vocal
resistance  or revolution  because  of material  conditions,  a past history  of extractive  taxation,
and  the  abolition  of communal  institutions.
417.  THE ADOPTION  OF GROWTH-REDUCING  POLICIES
In this  section  we return  to the key  questions  that motivate  this essay: what induces
societies  to adopt  growth-reducing  policies  and why do such policies  persist? Historical
analysis  and the theory  of public choice suggest  that inefficient  policies  are likely to be
adopted  when the conditions  for competitive  bargaining  between  interest  groups are not
met-an  issue that is closely related to material  conditions  and initial endowments  of
specific  groups. Here,  we elaborate  on this  point  and consider  the importance  of institutions
and  organizational  residues  for policy  formulation.
7.1 Initial conditions
An unequal distribution  of  initial endowments  in environments  where financial
markets  are imperfect  and  credit  is rationed  can prevent  a large  proportion  of the population
from making  productive  investments. In fact, a number  of recent  cross-sectional  studies
have found a  robust negative relationship  between initial levels of  inequality in the
distribution  of income  or wealth  and subsequent  growth  (Alesina  and Rodrik  1994;  Persson
and  Tabellini  1994;  Deininger  and  Squire  1996). Several  early  studies  sought  to explain  this
relationship  as resulting  from an unproductive  but costly  redistribution  from the rich to the
poor  which  was  imposed  by the  "median  voter".39  However  this  explanation  does  not  accord
with the observation  that the poor  are less likely than others  to participate  in the political
process and with the failure to find an empirical  association  between  the degree of
redistribution  and lower  growth. Recent  models  that incorporate  a richer set of empirical
regularities  point to the possibility  of multiple  steady  states,  which are determined  by a
combination  of initial  conditions  and endogenous  institutional  arrangements  in  the  economy.
Bourguignon  and  Verdier (forthcoming)  develop a  model  in  which  political
participation  depends  on the educational  status  of a person  (only  educated  individuals  can
39 The argument is that the more unequal is the distribution of wealth or income, the further from the average will be
the median voter, and the higher is the tax rate he approves on wealth or income.  The higher is the tax rate, the lower are the
incentives for the wealthy to invest in productive activities,  and thus the lower is the growth rate of the economy.  Societies
with very unequal distribution of wealth or income should therefore  be characterized by high tax rates on the rich and low
growth.
42vote).  Because of the absence of capital markets, individuals with endowments below a
minimum level will  not be able to  acquire human capitaleven  though it  is  privately
profitable-unless  they receive an education subsidy.  They will not therefore be able to
participate in the political process.  Educating  the poor will always result in higher growth.
But, educating the poor will lead to the ultimate loss of political control of the oligarchy (the
class of individuals  with the means to privately finance education). Depending  on the initial
distribution  of income and the size of the educational  externality (the benefits to society from
educating the poor), the steady state will involve a pure oligarchy with no growth, a ruling
oligarchy that accommodates  a middle class without giving up power and moderate growth,
or a democracy  with income redistribution  and fast growth.
Benabou (1994) goes  one  step  further,  using a  stochastic growth  model with
incomplete  asset markets. In his model the rich have more political influence than the poor,
and  citizens  vote  democratically on  proposed  progressive taxation  and  redistribution
schemes. Thus redistributions  that would increase aggregate welfare receive less political
support in  societies with  unequal wealth  and  income distributions than  in  egalitarian
societies (leading to further increases in inequality). Two stable steady states emerge, one
with high income and wealth inequality, and little redistribution, and one with low income
and wealth inequality, and higher redistribution.  Economies  with greater redistribution  will
grow  faster  if  the  productivity advantage  from  reallocating resources  outweigh  the
distortions introduced  by redistributive  taxation.
What is common to these models is that initial conditions determine which of the
feasible equilibria will  be  attained.  Without  significant exogenous changes in  these
conditions (including the underlying technical relationships, or the power structure within
society), it is unlikely that an economy will move from one equilibrium  to another.
7.2  Lack of institutions
The  importance of  institutions can  be explained in  a  context of  self-interested
politicians  who myopically or strategically pursue short-term goals, even when the resulting
policies would reduce long-term growth.  The state's ability to commit to taking particular
actions can be crucial in a strategic setting (Rodrik 1992).  A weak state, which has little
43ability  to enforce  contracts  or take actions,  will systematically  underprovide  economically
desirable  public  goods  and,  at the same time,  undertake  politically  motivated  interventions
that are economically  harmful. While all states may be using  the same instruments,  the
weak  state  consistently  chooses  wrong  policies,  encouraging  rent  seeking  and  unproductive
spending  rather  than  productive  investment.40
Evidence  has accumulated  over  the past  decades  that macroeconomic  stability,  the
real exchange  rate, and nonagricultural  protection  are major influences  on agricultural
growth  (Gardner  forthcoming;  Krueger,  Shiff,  and Valdes  1991). We therefore  need  to look
at the types of institutions  that can ensure macroeconomic  stability  and an appropriate
foreign  exchange  regime.
A large number  of empirical  studies  comparing  institutions  across  countries  show
that the existence  of independent  central  banks and mechanisms  that ensure budgetary
discipline,  political  stability,  fiscal decentralization,  and free trade are generally  associated
with  better  economic  performance,  even  if other  factors  are taken  into  account.
The existence  of independent  central  banks seems  to be consistently  associated
with better  economic  performance  (Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti  1992). Independent
central  banks  have  forced  even  countries  of the Organisation  of Economic  Co-operation  and
Development  (OECD)  to adopt sounder  fiscal policies  (Alesina,  Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti
1993). Furthermore,  institutional  arrangements,  such as a "no deficit  carryover"  rule, and
expenditure  limitations,  such as those adopted  in many states of the United  States,  are
strongly correlated  with more rapid-and  less costly-adjustment to  unexpected  fiscal
deficits,  such  as occurred  during  the  economic  downturn  of the 1980s  (Poterba  1994).
40 The importance of the state is shown by the example of Korea, which provides subsidies to industries.  In contrast
to attempts in other countries, the subsidies have succeeded in stimulating productive investment, which appears to be related
to the government's  ability to base the subsidies on transparent criteria  and to credibly threaten to withdraw them in case of
noncompliance. Grabowski (1994) proposes a similar game-theoretic explanation, based on a game between a government that
provides investment subsidies and the private sector.  In his model everyone would be better off in the long run if the subsidies
were invested.  But, the firm  with a sufficiently short time horizon would rather consume the subsidies and bribe government
officials just enough to make them collaborate, leading to a net loss for society.  In a repeated game context, the credible threat
of immediate withdrawal of the subsidy can lead to a Pareto-optimal outcome.
44Theory  also  suggests  that  free  trade  can reduce  a government's  ability  to rely  on and
benefit  from  monetary  expansion,  since  monetary  expansion  affects  exchange  rates  more  in
open economies  than in closed ones.  A study looking  at empirical  evidence  for 114
countries  found  that the  degree  of openness  is highly  and  significantly  correlated  with  lower
inflation,  greater  political  stability,  and greater  independence  of the central  bank-thus also
demonstrating  the mutually  reinforcing  character  of these institutions  (Romer  1993). The
result  is robust  for different  subsamples,  but vanishes  for a sample  containing  only OECD
countries.  This breakdown  suggests  that OECD  countries  have  other  institutions  preventing
short-sightedness  on  the part  of politicians.
A system  of fiscal federalism  can limit  arbitrary  behavior  of the central  government
(Casella  and Frey 1992). Establishment  of independent  but accountable  institutions  at
lower  levels  of government  can strengthen  the state,  while at the same  time placing  limits
on its ability  to confiscate  the wealth  of its citizens  by arbitrarily  changing  the rules  of the
game  (Weingast  1992). The  more  mobile  are its citizens,  the  more  important  is competition
between  different  levels  of government.  But,  this competition  could  be jeopardized  if strong
and enforceable  systems of accountability  and monitoring  by citizens and the central
government  are  lacking,  leading  to dominance  of local  institutions  by the rural  elite.
The term  political  stability  has often been used  to describe  the presence  of strong,
impartial,  and accessible  institutions;  an unambiguous  division  of power between  different
branches  of government;  and their  mutual  control  and  vigilance. Political  stability  promotes
private  as well  as public  investment.41  Political  instability  will reduce  private  investment  as it
directly  or indirectly  threatens  the security of such investment. The empirical  evidence
contains  many  examples  of the close relationship  between  political  instability,  low private
investment,  and low  growth  (Edwards  and Tabellini  1991;  Edwards  1994).
Political  instability  would  also likely  affect  the nature  of public  investment.  In strong
states rulers  can invest  in public  goods  that enhance  growth. In weak states,  the lack of
broad  popular  support  and the inability  to hold on to power  indefinitely  shortens  the rulers'
41  Political stability is a necessary,  but not sufficient condition for economic growth.  There are many examples of
stable, but repressive states, which failed to promote investment or growth.
45time horizons  and forces  them to redistribute  resources  as bribes  to potential  contenders
(Moe  1990;  Wintrobe  1990). Redistributing  resources  may  eventually  require  more  revenue
than  can be sustainably  extracted  from  the farm sector,  causing  small  farmers  to revert  to
subsistence  production  (or the informal  urban  labor  market),  and  outputs  and  tax revenue  to
fall. Additionally,  the policies  may lead  to a collapse  of foreign  exchange  reserves  needed
to purchase  imported  inputs  for agriculture  and manufacturing,  leaving  the state  with crises
of fiscal revenue,  foreign  exchange,  and domestic  output.  Empirical  studies  have found
some  evidence  that government  weakness  played  an important  role in the accumulation  of
foreign  debt in many  countries  during  in the 1980s  (Ozler  and Tabellini  1991)  and that low
growth  and  political  instability  are mutually  reinforcing  (Alesina,  et al. 1992).
Many developing  countries  inherited  institutions  that benefit ruling groups at the
expense  of large portions  of the population. The resources  available  to the elite-natural
resources,  rents, revenues  from commodity  exports, and, often, outside economic  and
military assistance-helped maintain  productivity-reducing  policy regimes for prolonged
periods  of time and eliminated  the budget  constraint  that is critical for the attainment  of
optimal  policy  outcomes. This outflow  made  political  leadership  a highly  desired  source  of
patronage  and  led  to the dissipation  of resources  on a grand  scale  through  rent  seeking. In
such situations, domestic interest groups may  fiercely resist the  establishment  of
independent  institutions,  such  as judiciaries  and  independent  central  banks.
8. Policy change
How, and under what conditions,  can policies  that facilitate growth and reduce
inequality  and poverty  (equation  4) be enacted  and sustained? Experience  suggests  that
external  shocks do not generally  trigger or lead to the maintenance  of major growth-
enhancing  policy  reforms. Nor does  internal  revolt. However,  if exogenous  shocks  lead  to
a fiscal crisis of the state, then the resulting  changes  in the bargaining  position  of groups
can provide  the opportunities  to initiate reform and establish  institutions  that-possibly
irreversibly-change the character  of subsequent  political interaction  between interest
groups.
468.1 Exogenous  shocks
The  impact  of exogenous  shocks  depends  critically  on the  fiscal  position  of the state
and the institutional  and political  environment.  On the one hand,  the state may wish to
compensate  groups  that are hurt  as a result  of the  shock  (Magee,  Brock,  and  Young  1989).
On the  other  hand,  negative  shocks  may reduce  the state's  ability  to provide  compensation,
thus  decreasing  the payoff  to redistribution  and providing  an opportunity  for comprehensive
policy  reform  (Drazen  and Grilli 1993). The outcome  depends  on the state's  overall  fiscal
capacity.  A  government  with liquid assets and an unrestricted  ability to  borrow can
compensate  small groups hurt by adverse  shocks or, conversely,  initiate redistributive
policies  in response  to positive  shocks. But,  a government  without  such resources  may  be
forced  to undertake  policy  reform.
It is not  surprising  that external  shocks,  such  as changes  in the terms  or trade  or the
cost of borrowing  in international  markets,  result  in unpredictable  outcomes. An external
shock  will have  differential  impacts  on individual  interest  groups,  depending  on  the nature  of
the shock and the country  affected. Interest  groups  will agree  to changes  only when  the
result  of the change  would  be better  than  the alternatives.  Thus even  when reforms  would
enhance  aggregate  efficiency,  they may be delayed  if they are not acceptable  to certain
interest  groups  (Alesina  and Drazen  1991). Inequality  in income,  wealth,  or composition  of
assets  may  provide  opportunities  to some  groups  to hold out in the process  of reform  and
impose  the cost of adjustment  on others  (for example,  holders  of wealth may shift assets
abroad  to avoid an inflationary  tax, an option not available  to all).  In highly polarized
societies,  the rich may be able to wait until the poor are willing  to shoulder  most of the
burdens  associated  with  reform.
This  model  can also  explain  other  behaviors  of individual  economic  agents  or interest
groups.  An industry  hurt  by an adverse  shock  will  decide  to lobby  for compensation-rather
than  adjust-if  it expects  politicians  to react  favorably  to the request. The expectations  of
the industry  will depend  on the past history  of awarding  protection  to specific  sectors,  in
addition  to the  state's  aggregate  fiscal  capacity  (Brainard  and  Verdier  1994).
47The effect  of the population  collapse  that occurred  with the Black  Death  shows  how
identical  exogenous  shocks  can have  highly  varied  impacts. This catastrophe,  which  killed
between  one-third  and one-half  of the population  in Western  Europe  between  1350 and
1500  (most seriously  between  1347-51),  led to an improvement  of peasant  rights in the
western  zone  of Europe,  but to a second  enserfment  and reduction  of peasant  rights  in the
eastern  zone  (for  example,  Poland  and  the former  East  Germany).  Brenner  (1977)  was  the
first to suggest  that differences  in the  institutional  environments  of the  two regions  may  have
led  to the different  outcomes. The  western  zone,  which  was more  densely  populated,  was
characterized  by strong  village institutions  that developed  to protect and regulate  village
commons,  and provided  peasants  with bargaining  power  to establish  rents, the ability to
enforce rights of inheritance,  and the right to elect village mayors and priests.  These
institutions  were independent  of  state control and could defend their rights against
incursions  by landlords.  By contrast,  the eastern  zone  was characterized  by a high  degree
of centralization,  the strong  leadership  of landlords,  an absence  of common  lands,  and little
tradition  of protecting  rights  of peasants.
Evidence  contradicts  the hypothesis  that external  shocks,  on their own, bring  about
growth-enhancing  policy refomis.  Positive external shocks often did not lead to an
improvement  in the  fiscal position  of governments.  Where  governments,  rather  than  private
entrepreneurs,  unexpectedly  gained  access  to large  amounts  of export  revenues,  they  were
often unable  to either  save the revenue  inflows  for use when the conditions  returned  to
normal or to resist political  pressure  for redistribution.42  Some countries  experiencing
commodity  booms  went  on spending  binges  that, in political  environments  characterized  by
clientelism  and lack  of planning  capacity,  did not  increase  the long-term  productive  capacity
of the economy. Often,  the exchange  rate appreciation  that accompanied  the commodity
boom (Dutch  disease)  and government  spending  hurt agricultural  producers,  increasing
polarization  rather  than reducing  it.  Cross-country  evidence  clearly  shows  that in the vast
majority  of cases commodity  booms  reinforced  preexisting  social,  political,  and economic
42  The only  examples where such a result  was at least  partly achieved are cases in  which the foreign  exchange
revenues partly accrued to private organizations such as the coffee growers'  association in Colombia  (Cdrdenas and Pont6n
1995), or in Kenya (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning 1993).
48divisions  rather than reducing  or eliminating  them (Little, et al. 1993).  In response  to
negative  shocks  occurring  later,  governments  often  imposed  import  restrictions  as they  tried
to protect  the import  substitution  industries  founded  during  the  boom  (and  possibly  the ruling
party's power base)-a  goal that prevented  them from devaluing  the currency. These
policies  generally  hurt  the tradeable  sectors  (including  agriculture),  worsened  existing  social
inequities,  and  set in motion  further  rent  seeking  efforts  and pressures  for higher  deficits.
Empirical  and  historical  studies  show  that when  external  shocks  trigger  or aggravate
a fiscal  crisis,  changes  in the institutional  and policy  environment  often  result. A fiscal  crisis
makes  the  aggregate  budget  constraint  more  binding,  reducing  the potential  for obfuscation
and other  forms  of misinformation,  and  increasing  the bargaining  power  of groups  that have
access  to resources  or information. However,  reform  efforts, once initiated,  may not be
sustained.
A fiscal crisis  can make it impossible  for those in power  to buy off or suppress  an
emerging  alternative  coalition.  Historically,  state financial distress, a  high degree of
intraelite  competition,  and a  potential  for  mass mobilization  have been identified  as
important  preconditions  of reform (Goldstone  1991).43  Most developing-country  reforms
were  initiated  in response  to deteriorating  economic  conditions,  such  as balance  of payment
crises, inflation,  capital  flight, and the obvious  failure of the state to provide  the social
services  or favors  demanded  by politically  influential  groups  (Bates  and Krueger  1993). By
contrast,  reform has often been avoided,  or stabilization  plans abandoned,  where there
were  alternative  ways  to avert  crises,  such  as by increasing  taxation  of politically  powerless
groups  or by exploiting  and selling  natural  resources.  This is in line  with  the importance  of
fiscal crises in eliminating  well-established  interest-group  equilibria,  as emphasized  by
Olson  (1993)  and recently  confirmed  empirically  by Ben-David  and Papell  (1995).
43 The endogeneity  of these variables, which may be related to lack of economic  growth and a high degree of
unproductive  activity,  is not explicitly  considered.
498.2 Revolt
Exogenous  shocks  and resulting  fiscal  crises  can trigger  revolt. But revolt  may  also
occur  independently,  as illustrated  by a number  of theoretical  models  that focus  mainly  on
the use of revolt,  or the threat of revolt,  in a bargaining  game between  interest  groups.
Peasants  who are disadvantaged  by existing  policies  are unlikely  to initiate  revolt  without
strong  coalition  partners. Even if successful  in achieving  immediate  demands,  peasant
revolts  have  rarely  brought  about  lasting  reforms  and improvements  in peasant  welfare.-
Successful  peasant  revolts  occurred  only  when  the state  was  weak  or in fiscal  crisis,
making  it difficult  for rulers  to co-opt  the revolutionaries  and their  coalition  partners  through
concessions,  and making  it possible  for peasants  to enlist  powerful  allies  inside or outside
the  state  apparatus,  in particular  those  with financial  and military  resources  to support  their
cause. Revolts  were also more likely where  the state had attacked  peasants'  collective
identity,  where revolutionary  leaders  had promised  tangible  improvements  and addressed
specific  grievances,  where  the  potential  benefits  and/or  the probability  of success  were  high,
and where  other avenues  of political  articulation  (or co-optation  of a part of the peasantry)
were  not  available  (Tilly  1990).45
Even if numerically  superior,  peasants'  low potential  for collective  action makes  it
virtually  impossible  for their revolts  to succeed  without  militarily  powerful  coalition  partners.
Such  a coalition  enables  urban-based  revolutionaries-who  appreciate  the access  to food
I Revolt may take many forms, from passive resistance and small scale violence to massive rebellions.  Persons or
groups harmed by existing policies often engage in passive or small scale active resistance by (Scott 1985).  The theoretical
literature has recently explored these activities.  If the poor do not have the ability to expropriate resources from the wealthy
through the ballot box, they may try to obtain resources by pilfering and other kinds of extralegal expropriative activities.  If
the marginal return to banditry exceeds the marginal return to wage employment, landlords would favor distributing just the
quantity of  land needed to prevent peasants  from engaging in banditry (Grossman  1994).  This may explain  why  in some
countries,  land reform was undertaken only after  more coercive means to ensure peace were  no longer feasible.  A  similar
Nash  "equilibrium path of land reform" can be derived by treating the power of landlords and peasants as exogenously given
(Horowitz 1993).
45 Elimination of the traditional insurance and judicial methods practiced in communal systems appears to be at the
root  of many peasant revolts in the history of  industrial and developing countries alike.  Threats to communal tenure  and
peasants'  right to elect the village mayor and priest were  a key issue in the German Bauernkrieg.  In  this case,  the other
conditions for revolt were satisfied as well: other avenues had been tried unsuccessfully, the traditional establishment was in
financial  crisis,  its  ideological basis was  weakened by  the  Protestant reformation,  and  there  was a  potential  for  tangible
improvement in the material situation of the average peasant (Magagna 1991).
50and the local  knowledge  of places  to serve  as a hideouts-to harness  peasant  discontent
through  promises  or coercion  (Kriger  1992;  Palmer  1977). Most  revolutionaries,  therefore,
supported  programs  that selectively  met peasants'  demands,  such as those providing
access  to land or eliminating  legal discrimination.  Additionally,  states seeking to quiet
peasant  unrest  adopted  such  programs.
Rural  discontent  can,  even  without  the threat  of major  revolt,  cause  powerful  groups
to undertake  limited  reform  and accept  the associated  loss  of some resources. However,
such  reforms  are not  necessarily  socially  beneficial,  as is clearly  illustrated  by the  failures  of
poorly designed land reform programs  and the modernization  of hacienda  systems in
reaction  to the threat  of massive  peasant  unrest  in the early  1960s  in many  Latin  American
countries  (de  Janvry  and  Sadoulet  1990).
Peasants'  lack of potential  for collective  action appears  to be responsible  for the
almost  universal  failure  of revolts  to improve  their  welfare,  even in cases  where  the revolts
succeed  and are characterized  by strong  peasant  participation.  There  are numerous  cases
of measures  being  enacted  after  a revolt  which  directly  favored  the urban  against  the rural
population  (Nicaragua),  settled  political  cronies  on marginal  lands  but provided  little more
than promises  for the rest (Zimbabwe),  or simply avoided  distributing  land to individual
farmers  because  doing so would conflict  with the ideological  goals of the state (Cuba).
Because these measures  were often associated  with large inefficiencies-by forcing
agriculture  onto  an  excessively  capital-intensive  path  or by collectivizing  farms-they did not
increase  the  stability  of the postrevolutionary  systems.
8.3 Factors  that  enhance  sustainability  of reforms
While a fiscal crisis is usually necessary  for initiating  reform, a politically  vocal
coalition  supporting  reform  is necessary  to ensure  that reform  is durable  and successful.
Sustained  improvements  in policy  outcomes  appear  to have  been limited  to situations  in
which the fiscal crisis led to the formation  of institutions  that allowed  the participation  of
more  groups  in the political  process  or increased  individuals'  ability  to demand  enforcement
of rules.  In the context of fiscal crises technical  advice,  assistance  that helps specific
interest  groups  articulate  their demands  politically,  and provision  of resources  by outside
51agents can strongly affect the outcome of the reform process.  Reforms are more
sustainable  when  the outcomes  are  viewed  as fair, rather  than  being  challenged  by losers.
*  Character  of supporting  coalition.  The durability of reform requires the
support  of a coalition  of groups  benefiting  from reform. Building  coalitions  is easier if the
distortions  associated  with  earlier  policies  are large  or groups  benefiting  from  earlier  policies
are weakened,  a range of feasible policy options is available,  the state has sufficient
technical  and administrative  capacity,  and the reform effort is credible (Haggard  and
Kaufman  1992).
The creation  and strengthening  of a coalition  supporting  reform  appears  critical  to
ensuring  success. Where  potential  beneficiaries  are not sufficiently  organized  politically  or
where  there is little policy  dialogue  that allows  the government  to explain  and fine-tune  its
policies, reform  programs often  encounter great  difficulties.  Increased political
representation  is particularly  important  where the beneficiaries  of reform  are peasants  or
small  traders  who  are dispersed  and  have  little  political  voice.
- Institutions  supporting  fiscal  discipline.  Ability  to exercise  strong  central  fiscal
control, through  the central bank and the ministry of finance is critical to maintairning
budgetary  discipline,  keeping  inflation  down, and preventing  special  interest  groups from
undermining  reform  efforts.- For a number  of reasons,  the ability  to exert such  control  is
greatly enhanced  if reform is undertaken  swiftly.  First, rapid action is likely to return
economies  to a growth  path  faster;  step-wise  implementation  of reform  can be justified  on
economic  grounds only if rapid action risks backlash  and policy reversal  (Wei 1991).
Second,  quick  implementation  of reform  allows  an incoming  government  to use honeymoon
periods  and signal its commitment,  which enhance  its credibility  (Rodrik 1989).  Third,
where reforms  are implemented  quickly,  opportunities  for interest  groups to organize  in
opposition  are minimized.
46  Experience does not confirm the conventional wisdom that military regimes have an advantage in exercising such
control.  The cases (Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria) where populist or ethnic cleavages frustrated military and civilian governments
alike,  as well as examples presented  in the literature on the coup-trap  (Londregan and Poole  1990), caution against  such a
romantic view of strong leadership.
52*  International  support  can make reform efforts more credible and provide
access  to international  credit and technical  assistance  (Santaella  1993).  However,  the
availability  of international  finance  can also delay  stabilization,  for example,  by propping  up
an unsustainable  regime. In highly  polarized  countries  an important  side effect of external
assistance  may be the initiation  of a comprehensive  policy dialogue  that includes  the
opposition  (Haggard  and Kaufman  1994).
*  Analytical  capacity.  In many  reform  efforts  analytical  capacity,  often provided
by technocrats  in enclaves  isolated  from political  pressures,  is indispensable  for analyzing
the  current economic situation, providing technically-sound  solutions, and  ensuring
continuous  adherence  to the reform  effort. A necessary  technical  condition  for the ability  to
exercise  fiscal control  is that basic information  on the economic  situation  is available  and
that  the  incentive structures in  the  bureaucracy  ensure impartial implementation.47
Combining macroeconomic  stabilization, which  produces large  gains,  with  trade
liberalization,  in which  most  of the social  gain  comes  at the expense  of well-defined  interest
groups,  has made  policy  reforms  much  more  acceptable  to citizens  (Rodrik  1992).
Since policy  reform presents  risks for some individuals  and groups,  an important
issue  is the provision  of social  safety  nets.48  Providing  a basic  level  of insurance  for losers
greatly increases  political support for  reforms.49  Eichengreen  (1992) argues that the
presence  of social  safety  nets and investments  that improved  citizens'  access  to education
47  If policy reform requires significant reallocation of factors across industries, it is essential that the financial system
functions well.  For Sri Lanka, Athukorala and Rajapatirana (1993) show that financial sector policies supported the beneficial
effects of trade liberalization on both the demand and supply sides.  On the demand side, attractive returns on financial assets
encouraged people to save their increased incomes rather than spend it on nontradeables-which  otherwise would have led to
premature  appreciation of the real  exchange rate and undermined the competitiveness of the tradable sector.  On the supply
side,  increased savings provided funds to  invest in the export  sector-as  indicated by  the increasing credit  flows to  small
enterprises.
48 Hardy (1992) argues that lack of social safety nets is the main reason for governments'  inability to close obsolete
and  inefficient state-owned enterprises.  In many of  the transforming  economies  state enterprises  are  the sole  institutions
reaching the poor.  This issue is even more important where sta,z-owned enterprises recognize their significance and behave
strategically.
49 Concerning  the potential importance  of  insurance,  Fernandez  and  Rodrik (1991) demonstrate that  because  the
beneficiaries of reform cannot be known ex ante, efficiency-enhancing reforms may not be adopted.  Once reforms have been
adopted, the uncertainty is resolved.  This can explain why reforms undertaken by autocratic regimes (Pinochet in Chile) may
survive even when the countries adopt democratic political regimes.
53and health  facilities  were instrumental  in bringing  about a social consensus  during the
reconstruction  in Western  Europe  after  World  War II.  The existence  of social  safety nets
weakened  support for nationalist  forces, prevented  conflict between  groups with long-
standing  animosity,  and  led  to rapid  economic  growth.53
The process  of reforming  agricultural  policies  has accelerated  in the 1990s  in the
developing  world.  The triggers  have  been fiscal crises.  Enhanced  international  support
through  the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT)  negotiations,  from  the World
Trade Organization  (WTO),  and from the World Bank  and bilateral  donors  has also been
important. Still, reforms  of agricultural  and agrarian  policies  have  often lagged  well behind
general  macroeconomic  reforms  and structural  adjustment.
A recent  study  of six developing  countries,  chosen  because  of their commitment  to
agricultural  policy  reform  in the 1980s  and early 1990s,  shows  just how difficult  the reform
process  has been and how incomplete  it remains  (Gardener  forthcoming).51  This result is
not  surprising:  distortionary  agricultural  and agrarian  policies  are often  fully consistent  with
underlying  material  conditions  and  the prevailing  features  of the political  environment.  They
are frequently  linked  to organizational  residues,  such  as commodity  boards,  parastatals,  or
collective  farms. Their elimination  and overall  agrarian  reform  would benefit  groups  who
have  poor  potential  for collective  action  and  who are hard  to include  in postreform  coalitions,
such as  peasants,  the  landless, or  dispersed consumers.  Both governments  and
beneficiaries  have limited  analytical  capacity  to evaluate  the economic  impact  of reform.
And  the  real impact  of policies  is easy  to obfuscate.
E  Eichengreen (1992) argues that the most important impact of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe was that it
facilitated a social pact and reduced the political  instability that had caused individuals to "hoard commodities and withhold
effort."  This provision of  safety nets not  only facilitated economic stability,  allowed governments to balance budgets,  and
removed the danger of confiscatory taxation that had caused potential investors to wait,  but also provided critical support for
proponents of a more market-oriented, rather than command-driven economic approach.
1' The countries were Chile,  Ghana, Honduras,  Indonesia, Madagascar,  and Mexico.  The study also included New
Zealand, an OECD country,  and Hungary, an economy in transition.
548.4 From  taxation  to protection:  Is agriculture  a special  case?
A paradox  that needs  to be resolved  is why countries  of Western  Europe,  Japan,
Korea,  and  Taiwan  have,  during  the  past  fifty  years,  enjoyed  rapid  industrial  and  agricultural
growth  and dramatic  reductions  in rural  poverty. Farms  that rely primarily  on the labor  and
management  of owner-operators  dominate  their  agricultural  sectors.  Agricultural  output  has
risen  dramatically  in these countries  in response  to high real prices  (usually  above  world
market  levels)  and  other  supports,  turning  most  of the countries  from  net importers  into net
exporters. Countries  with the least  comparative  advantage  in agriculture,  such as Japan,
Norway,  and Switzerland,  have  supported  agriculture  the most. The agricultural  policies  of
these  countries  have  been modestly  successful  in supporting  rural  incomes,  but they have
been  costly  to consumers  and  the  state.
The shift  of these  Western  European  and East  Asian  countries  to greater  and  greater
agricultural  protection  during  the second half of the twentieth  century  illustrates  how the
elements and  processes discussed in  this  paper can  illuminate complex political
55processes. 5 2 At the conclusion  of World  War II countries  were left  with a great number  and
variety  of policies,  programs,  and organizational  residues  put  into place  to manage  food and
agricultural  raw materials  during  the  war. These  could  readily  be put  to different  uses  such
as agricultural  protection  and  income  support.
The land reforms  implemented  in Japan,  Taiwan,  and Korea  led to rapid growth  in
agricultural  output  and rural incomes. In all of the countries  rising  urban  productivity  and
incomes  increased  the  opportunity  cost  of farming,  and  encouraged  workers  to migrate  from
rural  areas  to cities. Reduced  numbers  of rural  dwellers  and rising  incomes  increased  the
collective  action potential  of rural groups in general.  Greater commercialization  and
specialization  of farming increased  the collective  action potential  of  narrowly  focused
commodity-based  groups. Rural-urban  migration  reduced  the number  of farmers,  but did
not diminish  the political  representation  of rural  areas,  since  voting  rules  were not adjusted
to fully  reflect  changes  in population  distribution.
The commodity  price boom brought  about by the Korean  War strengthened  the
resolve  of governments  to maintain  the security  of national  food supplies,  further  boosting
the political  power  of farmers. The food shortages  of the early 1970s  similarly  spurred
countries  to adopt  policies  to ensure  national  food supplies. Many of the policies  initiated
during  these  years  remain  in place  today.
In recent years attempts  to reduce the distortions  of farm policies have led to
adjustments  in the Common  Agricultural  Policy  of the European  Union  and the inclusion  of
agriculture  in the framework  of the  World Trade  Organization.  An in-depth  analysis  of the
factors  contributing  to these  changes  would  be one important  way of testing  the empirical
usefulness  of the principles  outlined  above. There seems  to be a consensus  that the two
main  factors  responsible  for this change  have been fiscal considerations  (Gardner  1996)
and  the establishment  of international  institutions,  such  as the GATT  and the WTO, which
linked  liberalization  of agriculture  to freer  trade  in other  commodities.
52 A number of articles reviewed here (for example, Hayami and Anderson 1986) have emphasized that many of the
factors that have been discussed in this review have been very relevant in explaining the transition to higher production.
569.  MAIN IMPLICATIONS
In this  section  we discuss  implications  under  three  headings.  First,  we ask what  are
the key regularities,  and how can they be explained  better  with the theories  and empirical
evidence  assembled  in this essay? We then discuss  how the systematic  introduction  of
these elements  would change  the appropriate  policies  for agricultural  development  and
agrarian  relations. We conclude  the essay with suggestions  on how to further improve
knowledge  in  this  area  through  theoretical  and applied  research.
9.1 Elements  and regularities  with explanatory power
The review of the literature  shows that the political  outcomes-which influence
agrarian  relations  and determine  agricultural  taxation,  subsidization,  and the provision  of
public  goods-result from  political  bargaining  between  interest  groups,  which  usually  takes
place  within  an economywide  budget  constraint.  The  decisions  reached  through  bargaining
are more likely to be efficiency-  and growth-enhancing  when equally powerful  interest
groups,  which are aware of the aggregate  government  budget constraint  and know the
economic  implications  of different  policy  options,  participate;  and when  impartial  institutions
facilitate participation  of all groups in economic and  political activities, and enforce
decisions.  The  greater  is the  deviation  from  these  conditions,  the greater  is the potential  for
efficiency-reducing  outcomes. In addition,  the costs  will fall disproportionately  on politically
underrepresented  or powerless  groups. The differences  in the potential  for collective  action
and the  degree of  political articulation  among groups involved in  bargaining  about
agricultural  and agrarian  policies  is particularly  striking.
0  Peasants'  potential for collective action.  Clearly, if  other markets are
functioning  reasonably  well,  organization  of agricultural  production  in owner-operated  family
farms  would  maximize  production  efficiency. Paradoxically,  these family  farmers  are very
unlikely to act collectively. The material  conditions  of agricultural  production-spatial
dispersion, seasonal work  cycles, covariance of  risk,  and  the  associate market
imperfections  under which family farmers operate-make it  difficult for  them to act
collectively  and  to be  aware  of the implications  of different  policy  options.  This  difficulty  also
limits their ability to use ideas, ideologies,  and information  and misinformation  to their
57advantage.  The low  potential  for collective  action  among  poor  peasants  explains  why  many
inefficient  policy  regimes  persist. It also explains  the striking  inability  of peasants  to initiate
revolts  in the absence  of a nonrural  coalition  partner,  and to transform  successful  revolts
into  lasting  political  change.
*  Rural elites' potential for collective action.  On the other hand, rural elites-
whether  nobility  or large-farmer  interest  groups-have very high  collective  action  potential,
as experience  in both industrial  and developing  countries  demonstrates.  Rural  elites  have
often been able  to secure  privileges  and avoid  taxation,  while small  family operators  have
not been able to do so.  And when  fiscal crises,  food supply emergencies,  or threats of
peasant  revolts  forced  the state to implement  reforms,  rural  elites  were frequently  able to
preserve  their privileges. For example,  rural elites  were often able to steer policies  and
programs  meant  to increase  rural  productivity  into capital-intensive  investment  programs  for
large farms, thus  perpetuating  inequality and  inefficiency.  Where  urban groups
implemented  low  food price  policies,  programs  to compensate  farmers  benefited  rural  elites
almost  exclusively,  to the  detriment  of rural  growth  and  the rural  poor.
- Variations in material conditions.  Such variations in agriculture over space
and  time,  and  in the associated  imperfections  in financial,  insurance,  and land  markets  have
powerful  impacts  not  only on economic  outcomes  and  accumulation  processes,  but also on
the political and  institutional  environment  and a  broad range of  political outcomes.
Population  density,  in particular,  has  been  used  as an explanatory  variable  in many  sections
of this paper.  Material  conditions  do change, although slowly, through accumulation
processes. While the government's  ability to alter the underlying  material  conditions  is
therefore  limited,  there are many examples  of how central  government-financing  of basic
health,  nutrition,  infrastructure,  research  and extension,  and  services  can reduce  the impact
of spacial  dispersion,  covariance  of risk, and lack  of knowledge-and  enhance  growth  and
diversification  of rural  activity. In the process  many  of the  market  imperfections  so prevalent
in rural  areas  of low-income  countries  are reduced.
*  Institutional and political environment provides incentives to individuals and
groups to invest, accumulate, and engage in political activity. In particular, the presence or
absence  of clearly  defined  rights  to own or use property,  and of independent  institutions
58affects  the propensity  and ability  of different  groups  to engage  in political  bargaining  and
rent seeking,  rather  than in productive  activities. While in the long-run  the features  of the
institutional  and political  environment  are endogenous,  they also embody  organizational
residues,  which,  at any given  time,  have  independent  impacts  on the bargaining  processes
that  determine  political  outcomes.
*  The negative  impacts  of inequality. The literature  reviewed  here indicates
that in environments  characterized  by imperfections  in financial  and insurance  markets,
income  inequality  may help  perpetuate  poverty  and  dualistic  development.  Credit  rationing,
imperfect  insurance  and land markets,  and the lumpiness  of investments  prevalent  in rural
areas limit the ability of the poor to acquire land, draft animals,  machinery,  and other
equipment  required  to operate  even  small farms. The same conditions  often force poor
people  to liquidate  stocks  of productive  capital  in  times  of distress.
Income inequality  may also increase  the likelihood  that governments  will adopt
policies  and programs  that reduce  efficiency. There are three main reasons  why.  First,
inequality  reduces  the participation  of the poor in political  processes,  both directly and
indirectly. This in turn, reduces  the likelihood  that the poor  have  access  to education  and
health  care services,  and other services  that would contribute  to growth. Inequality  may
hinder  the establishment  of independent  and impartial  institutions,  and the enforcement  of
binding  rules,  because  these  might  reduce  the  benefits  of the privileged.  Inequality  makes  it
easier  for the wealthy  to hold  out in political  bargaining,  either  directly  through  capital  flight.
It therefore  makes  it more  difficult  for societies  to respond  quickly  and optimally  to external
shocks, rather than adopting  growth-reducing  policies,  which, nonetheless,  protect the
privileges  of the  wealthy.
*  External  shocks,  the fiscal position of the state, and policy change. The
historical  and institutional  economics  literature  shows  clearly  how  fiscal  crises  of the state-
often  triggered  or aggravated  by an external  shock-frequently  bring about  lasting  changes
in policies  and institutions.  Fiscal  crises,  under  certain  conditions,  force  the  state  to devolve
some  of its  power  to independent  institutions  in  exchange  for financial  assistance  to meet  its
immediate  needs.  This devolution  may give rise to independent  legal, political, and
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growth.
External shocks such as changes in the terms of trade can have widely varied
impacts, depending on the material and political environment, and depending on the fiscal
position of the state.  In the event of negative exogenous shocks the state may attempt to
compensate  influential coalition partners. If the state has sufficient  cash reserves or access
to credit, it is able to assist them through the use of borrowing or temporary and relatively
nondistortionary  transfers from fiscal resources. If, on the other hand, the government  is in
financial difficulty, it may provide  compensation  by introducing  distortions that have no fiscal
cost-for  example, by allocating large tracts of frontier land or restricting the importation  of
goods competing  with those produced by coalition members. People who are not members
of  the  coalition  pay  the  costs.  Positive  external  shocks  can  also  have  negative
consequences.  If  a  government has  difficulty saving  the  temporary  inflow,  income
inequality is  likely to  rise,  which  may  increase the  country's  economic and  political
vulnerability  to negative  shocks.
Finally, under certain conditions the political and economic reforms brought about in
response  to a fiscal crisis may not be stable. Policy reversals are most likely to occur when
the state has insufficient means to finance growth-enhancing public goods, social safety
nets,  and  transfers  to  politically  articulated groups  to  reinforce  support  for  reform.
Paradoxically, therefore, a fiscal crisis, the main initiator of reform, may also ultimately
mean that the reforms cannot be sustained.  Rapid restoration of fiscal balance following
the fiscal crisis, and renewed access to international credit markets, are therefore likely to
be key to producing lasting reform.
External alliances.  Because of the importance of fiscal crises in triggering
reform and because of the critical need for access to fiscal resources to sustain reform,
external firms, international organizations, or foreign governments that provide financial
resources, military hardware,  or food to states in fiscal crisis have exceptional leverage in
shaping policy.  Whether they encourage the adoption of growth-enhancing  and poverty-
reducing policy changes depends on their motives and wisdom of those providing the
assistance.
609.2  Policy  advice  when  policies,  organizations,  and  institutions  are
endogenous
Economists  and  international  institutions  generally advises countries to  adopt
efficiency-  or growth-enhancing  policies. Nevertheless,  it is well known  that countries  are
most  likely  to initiate  reform  when  fiscal or foreign  exchange  crises make  reform  essential,
and, at the same  time, weaken  the state's  ability  to reward  members  of the coalition  who
supported  the old policy  regime. When  these  conditions  prevail,  domestic  or foreign  donors
or lenders  can use their financial  leverage  to persuade  countries  to adopt their policy
prescriptions. It is no accident  that the World Bank, regional  development  banks,  and
bilateral  aid agencies  adopted  policy-based,  quick-disbursing  loans  just as the second  oil
shock  created  fiscal  crises  for many  governments.
Consistent  with conclusions  of the literature  reviewed  here,  studies  examining  the
impact  of World  Bank  policy-based  lending  show  that  the reforms  will not lead  to sustained
improvements  in policies  unless  they are supported  by a strong  postreform  coalition. Thus
the World  Bank's  emphasis  on "government  ownership"  of the reform  agenda. Indeed,  this
review  suggests  that bargaining  equilibria  among  self-interested  groups  may often lead to
stable but inefficient  policy outcomes. In these situations  the leverage  of policy-based
lending  may  not  be  enough  to force  adoption  of first-best  policies.
An additional  complication  shown in the  literature review is that policies and
programs  that are normally  very desirable  may not  enhance  efficiency  under  some  material
conditions. For example,  fully private  land rights  where population  densities  are very low
may not lead  to higher  efficiency  and greater  growth. In addition,  material  conditions  may
affect the sustainability  of reform:  where population  density  is very low, rural elites are
strong  and have  ample  opportunities  to form  alliances  with  other  interest  groups  resistant  to
change.  Policy  advice  must  take  account  of these  complicating  factors.
Policy  advice  should  also be based  on a greater  understanding  of the opportunities
for reform  that are associated  with crises,  including-in addition  to fiscal crises-political
crises  caused,  for example,  by the  threat  of peasant  revolts. Several  of the  successful  East
Asian  land  reforms  were  reactions  to communist  takeovers  following  World  War II, while  the
61less  successful  Latin  American  ones  were  associated  with  the  Alliance  of Progress  following
the Cuban  Revolution.  The emergence  of land reform  programs  in Brazil has also been
triggered  by massive  peasant  mobilization,  threatening  a political  crisis. It is during  times  of
crisis  that urban  elites  may  be more  willing  and able  to check  the power  of rural  elites.
Policy change, in addition to  affecting  efficiency and income distribution,  also
modifies  the bargaining  power  of interest  groups  and  their  ability  to participate  in  the political
process. Successful  land reform improves  the political  articulation  of the beneficiaries.
Privatization  of parastatals  not  only reduces  fiscal  costs  and improves  competition,  but may
also  eliminate  organizational  residues  that could  lead  to the adoption  of future  distortionary
policies. Similarly,  openness  of the trade regime  reduces  the power  of domestic  interest
groups  and encourages  governments  to maintain  budgetary  discipline. The international
institutions  and bilateral  donors should  systematically  consider  these possible  outcomes
when  formulating  their  policy  advice.
The  importance  of income  equality. The finding  that increased  income  equality  can
generate  superior  economic  and political  outcomes  leads  to several  conclusions. Primary
education  and health  services,  especially  for the poor, rural inhabitants,  and women,  are
important  not only because  they foster growth  and help reduce poverty  through  several
well-known  channels, but also because they reduce income inequality,  and thereby
enhance  the collective  action  potential  of the poor. Safety  nets  are necessary  because  they
enable  the poor to avoid liquidating  their stocks of productive  assets in times of crisis,
leading  to more  equal  distribution  of wealth-which is important  for the  political  environment
in the long-run. Redistributive  land reform  not only gives  land to more  efficient  producers,
but  also reduces  credit market  imperfections,  which  lead  to improved  investment  decisions
by the poor. Greater  wealth  also increases  the ability  of the poor  to directly  participate  in
the  political  process.
In view of the importance  of independent  institutions  for the sustainability  of policy
reforms,  it is not surprising  that new types of policy  conditionality  in adjustment  lending
programs  have  recently  been  introduced  that  focus  on enhancing  the power  of independent
institutions-including  the establishment  of independent  central banks and judiciaries.
Decentralization  of  political, fiscal, and  administrative  power may change incentive
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participate,  thus creating  conditions  for bargaining  which  are more  conducive  to efficiency.
Reforming  local governments  to allow  for greater  competition  improves  transparency  and
reduces  the power  of rural  elites  to appropriate  benefits.  The rise  of civil  society  institutions,
especially  in a context  of greater  decentralization,  leads  to greater  participation. Groups
that were previously  unrepresented,  such as small farmers, can become  much more
involved  in choosing  and implementing  projects  that they benefit  from.  Participation  also
strengthens  the social capital  of poor beneficiaries  to influence  policy  decisions. Finally,
documenting  and measuring  the impact  of policies,  organizations,  and public  expenditures
on efficiency,  growth  and rural poverty  are needed  to reduce  the possibility  that interest
groups  succeed  in using  misinformation  and obfuscation  as a political  tool.  But it is not
sufficient  to produce  the knowledge.  Poor  and  vulnerable  groups  must  have  access  to it so
that  they no  longer  have  to operate  at a disadvantage.
9.3 Toward  greater  predictive  power
We are a long way from being able to explain  the differences  between  the four
groups  of countries,  and individual  countries  more  generally. Instead,  we have  identified  a
number  of key factors  that must  form part of an explanatory  framework. We have also
identified  the factors and regularities  that can be used to explain major changes in
agricultural  policy  and  that need  to be  taken  into account  in providing  policy  advice. But our
knowledge  is very limited  in certain  areas-for example,  the impact  of ideas  as generators
or facilitators  of policy  change-and remains  poorly  integrated  across  subfields  and  schools
of social  science.
Thus  there  is a great  need  to develop  a more  unified  theory  of a political  economy  of
agriculture  and agrarian  relations  that can be tested  empirically. Such  a theory  must be
embedded in the theories of  institutional  development,  state formation, and political
decisionmaking,  which deal with issues  well beyond  agriculture  and the rural economy.
Insights  from many disciplines  and analytical  traditions,  from neoclassical  economics  to
historical  materialism,  provide  important  elements  of such  a theory.
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of quantitative  analysis  and predictive  power? Developing  a theoretical  framework  is most
difficult  when all changes  in a country-the political and institutional  environment,  the
political  and economic  outcomes,  and the material  conditions-are endogenous. Partial
theories  that  try to explain  only  some  elements  can omit important  explanatory  variables,  or
treat  all  the right-hand  side  variables  as exogenous.  These  theories  often lead  to erroneous
attribution  of causality,  especially  in cross-country  comparisons. While it is possible  to
circumvent  this problem  by using  sequential  approaches  and taking the material  and/or
political  and institutional  conditions  as largely  exogenous,  unobserved  or unaccounted  for
variables  (such  as "fixed  effects")  may still undermine  the analysis. In truth, only natural
endowments  and  external  events  are strictly  exogenous.
One may therefore  initially  look only at the impact  of changes  or shocks in the
external environment  on the policies, institutions,  and programs of a country.  Fully
modeling  the long-term  dynamics  of political,  institutional,  and economic  change-even
though  desirable  in order  to focus  on the long-run  consequences  of alternative  agricultural
and agrarian policies-is  a much more distant goal.  Predictions  of how the political
environment  will change  in response  to external  or exogenous  shocks-including natural
disasters  and changes  in ideas,  the potential  for alliances,  prices,  opportunities  for trade
and borrowing,  and technology-can  be tested. The first task,  then, is to build  a model  or
theory  capable  of predicting  changes  in the political  environment  in response  to external
shocks. For  this  job one can use comparative  static  models  and  take many  of the material
conditions  and features  of the  political  environment  as constant,  even  though  in a long-term
dynamic  model  they will change-mostly as a consequence  of the policy  changes  initiated
by a shock. The models  could  then be  tested  by an evaluation  of how  identical  exogenous
shocks  affect  political  outcomes  differently  in different  countries,  or in the same  country  at
different times, depending on the  prevailing material conditions,  social and  political
environments,  political  institutions,  organizational  residues,  and the degree  of participation
of the major  interest  groups. This would lead  to more insights  on the role played  by the
factors  held  constant  in the  analysis  of shocks.
64What are the key features  of a predictive  framework? It is clear  that one cannot
analyze  the impact  of external  shocks  on economic  and political  outcomes  just by looking  at
agricultural  producers  or rural  groups. First,  distortionary  and compensatory  policies  are not
confined  to only  traditional  agricultural  policies,  but include  a much  wider  range  of rural  and
non-rural  policies,  institutions,  taxes,  and expenditures.  Second,  because  the  economywide
budget  constraint  plays such an important  role in whether  or not policy  changes  will be
implemented  and what the outcomes  are, the framework  must incorporate  all of the key
actors  who  bargain  over  the  political  outcomes  potentially  triggered  by a shock. This implies
that the analysis  must  include  the small  farmers  (politically  active  or not),  rural  elites,  urban
elites, urban organized  workers,  and the unorganized  and usually politically  uninvolved
urban informal  sector. Third, the impact  of shocks  and policies  on economic  outcomes
should  be analyzed  using  frameworks  in which  exchange  rates,  prices,  interest  rates,  and
wages  are endogenous.  Otherwise,  the impact  of the  shocks  and  polices  on the incomes  of
the participants  in the bargaining  game, and on the state's fiscal position,  cannot be
measured  accurately.
Such models  cannot  be built on the assumption  that constrained  maximization  of
growth  is being  pursued,  since  the empirical  evidence  suggests  clearly  that agricultural  and
agrarian  political  outcomes  have  often  been  much  more  inefficient  and  growth-reducing  than
would be consistent  with constrained  optimization  with distributional  objectives.  Any
modeling  strategy  must  admit  the possibility  of such  highly  inefficient  outcomes.
A model composed  of the features discussed  above would not allow for much
prediction  of specific  policy outcomes. In order to achieve  greater  predictive  capability,
constraints  must  be added  that limit  actions  by individual  groups  and the government-and
that thus therefore  restrict the range of possible  policy outcomes. These include  the
constraints  and regularities  that have  been  reviewed  extensively  in the main  sections  of the
paper: material conditions of  rural areas and  the  broader economies,  the  striking
differentials  in the power  of interest  groups,  regularities  of bargaining  processes,  the fiscal
position of the state at the time when shocks occur, and the political and institutional
environment  of the  economy  at the time  when  shock  occurs.
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